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Copyright is an innovation policy, a competition policy, and a free expression
policy. Copyright’s purpose to catalyze creative expression and innovation is
canonical; creativity and innovation are synergetic. Copyright has a long history
of regulating innovation and competing disseminators of creative works. It
seeks to balance incentivizing a public good with providing a private interest.
Copyright’s incentive/access paradigm must balance the incentives necessary
for an initial creator with the needs of subsequent creators and the public.1 This
creates an inevitable tension between a copyright holder’s right to exclude and
a downstream creator’s freedom of expression.2 Creative works are cumulative
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1. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting
the “difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation
of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow
of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand”); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281, 281 (1970) (arguing that British historian Lord Thomas Macaulay’s “statement
that copyright was ‘a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers’ reveals the
conflict of interest between the reader and the book producer that underlies much of the discussion
about copyright law” (quoting THOMAS MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT 25 (C. Gaston ed.
1914))).
2. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2004) (“[T]he conflict between
intellectual property and freedom of speech is obvious.”); Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian,
An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3
(2013) (“Intellectual property rights and the First Amendment pull in opposite directions.”); Joseph
P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 833 (2010) (“The apparent conflict is obvious.”).

33

34

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:33

creations that rely on prior works as building blocks.3 Creative works are often
the output of a first creator and are also an input of a second creator; the second
creator’s input, therefore, was an earlier creator’s output.4 Tension arises when
content creators want to maintain control over their works so they can monetize
and commodify them. Content users often resist this control because they want
the freedom to remix, mashup, and use someone else’s speech to participate in
democratic culture-making.5 This gives rise to a policy dilemma: overprotection threatens user-generated creativity and free expression, yet rampant
piracy threatens creative industries.6
There is also an inevitable tension between new and incumbent disseminators
of copyrighted works.7 From the early days of the printing press, copyright
policy has been inextricably intertwined with technology.8 New technology can
open new avenues to enjoy and distribute copyrighted works, and it can open
new ways to infringe works. New communication technologies have
fundamentally changed the way we create and disseminate speech. New
technologies lie at the intersection of free expression and culture in the digital

3. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) (“A culture could not exist if all free riding
were prohibited within it.”).
4. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 66–67 (2003) (noting that “[c]reating a new expressive work
typically involves borrowing or building on material from a prior body of works, as well as adding
original expression to it”); see, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intergenerational Equity and Intellectual
Property: Sticky Knowledge and Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (2011); Brett
Frischmann, Crossing Boundaries: Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 801, 803–05 (2009).
5. Hannibal Travis, Free Speech Institutions and Fair Use: A New Agenda for Copyright
Reform, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 673, 705 (2015) (“Online video and Internet user mashups
of movies and television shows have evolved into the preferred medium of expression for
Americans and other residents of developed nations.”).
6. E.g., Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279
(2004); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33–35 (1991).
7. E.g., Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright
Policy, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 178 (2012) (“The very emergence of the new technology and
the firms seeking to offer products or services based on that technology creates the potential for
conflict.”); Wu, supra note 6, at 341 (“[C]onflict between dissemination rivals is probably
inevitable as long as technological change creates the opportunity to undercut incumbents.”).
8. Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1838 (2009) (“Copyright law has a symbiotic relationship with technology.
Generally, new technology enables novel ways to enjoy copyrighted content, which opens new
markets for artists to sell their licensed works.”); DiCola & Sag, supra note 7, at 175–76 (“Each
new technology of copying and distribution since the printing press has presented both challenges
and opportunities.”). See also M. Ethan Katsh, Communications Revolutions and Legal
Revolutions: The New Media and the Future of Law, 8 NOVA L.J. 631, 633–34 (1984) (“[C]opyright
law developed after the invention of printing, wiretapping laws followed shortly after the invention
of the telephone, and laws of privacy were enacted as a result of the growth of newspapers.”).
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age and the commodification of information and knowledge.9 Modern
telecommunications allow for new speech opportunities by “the democratization
of authorship.”10 Protecting healthy breathing space for new communication
technology is an important First Amendment safeguard that enables more
expression and more distribution. Promoting the development of speech
technologies, which enable greater speech activities, serves “‘double duty’ . . .
by serving the freedoms of both the speech and the press.”11
Copyright policy matters today because we are “becoming a nation of makers
and sharers, not just consumers of other people’s copyrighted material.”12
Modern copyright policy affects everyday users of modern technology. The
effects of copyright are felt by more than just publishers and professional
authors.13
Copyright now regulates end users, not just specialized
intermediaries.14 No longer cabined and restricted to professional spheres of
those who publish and distribute content, copyright law has a present effect on
modern life.15 Furthermore, copyright’s expansion has made it hard to avoid
infringement: “We back up our hard disks; we forward emails to friends. We
read aloud to our children using funny voices for different characters; we play
CDs on our car stereos with our windows open.”16 Today, it is easy to
unintentionally infringe copyright.17
9. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Press in the Digital Edge: The Future of Free
Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 441 (2009).
10. Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1527
(2016) (“[T]he arrival of the Internet—and with it the democratization of authorship, the
digitization of everything, and the disappearance of physical copies—complicates the calculus. The
Internet, like the combustion engine to the farmer, is a technological discontinuity—a rapid spike
on the timeline of innovation that moves the future of technology onto a new plane.”).
11. Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 811 (2010). See also
Edward Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies: How the Right to Bear Arms Affects Copyright
Regulations of Speech Technologies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1037, 1047 (2009) (noting
that to the Framers of the U.S. Constitution the freedom of the press meant the “freedom of the
printing press”).
12. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE
BACK IN COPYRIGHT 7 (2011).
13. See James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 214–15
(2005) (noting a range of online activity that implicates a copyright holder’s exclusive rights “from
forwarding e-mail, backing up data, and printing a hard copy of an online document to caching
frequently accessed files, cataloging Internet sites, and webcasting one’s travels.”); John Tehranian,
Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543–48
(2007) (illustrating every day acts that could be found to infringe copyrights, resulting in daily
liability exposure of $12.45 million per day or $4.54 billion annually).
14. Wu, supra note 6, at 356–57; see also Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles
Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176 (2010).
15. Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364, 365
(2016) (“The Internet challenges us to understand copyright law as taking a more capacious role in
overall knowledge governance.”).
16. Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1919–20 (2007).
17. John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245, 265 (2015).
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The fair use doctrine has been harnessed to balance competing interests in
copyrighted works.18 The fair use defense “supplements the[] traditional First
Amendment safeguards” that protect our free expression interests.19 Copyright
is a means of incenting innovation and free speech; it is “not an end unto itself.”20
Much like freedom of expression and innovation are not ends in themselves,
copyright protection is not for its own sake.21 Free expression is a means of
fostering democratic self-governance, truth, and happiness. Innovation is a
means of fostering economic growth, prosperity, development, and happiness.
Copyright is a means of fostering the progress of science and enriching the
public domain from which others can freely draw. Ultimately, the benefit of
copyright should be the public interest.22
This Article offers a holistic assessment of copyright policy’s effects on
innovation and free speech before offering some sensible areas for reform. Part
I examines modern copyright policy and its justifications. Part II examines the
effect of copyright policy on innovation. Part III examines the effect of
copyright policy on our free speech culture and core First Amendment interests.
I argue modern copyright is out of balance. Expansive, exclusive rights, strict
liability, and the threat of hefty statutory damages discourage innovation and
free expression. Hydraulic pressure from incumbents has forced copyright out

Today, however, almost anyone can engage in such conduct with ease: most of us have,
by way of smartphones, scanners, and computers connected to the internet, the tools of
massive digital reproduction and distribution at our fingertips. As such, we all come into
contact with, and unwittingly violate, copyright law (i.e., by meeting the elements of a
prima facie case of infringement) dozens of times a day.
Id. See also Yvette Joy Liebesman, Redefining the Intended Copyright Infringer, 50 AKRON
L. REV. 765, 796 (2016) (“[T]echnological advancements in copying have led to the ability to
both more easily infringe and more easily be caught.”).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
19. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003).
20. E.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1491–92 (2007) (“[T]he American model [of copyright] views protecting authors’ rights . . .
[as] the means to produce a more robust intellectual and artistic culture.”).
21. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest
upon this ideal.”); see also Jack M. Balkin, Idea: The First Amendment Is An Information Policy,
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2012); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 337–38 (1991).
22. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.
Id.
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of kilter. Part IV, therefore, offers some suggestions for recalibrating copyright
policy to mitigate the chilling effect on innovation and our free speech culture.
I.

COPYRIGHT POLICY

According to conventional consequentialist intellectual property theory,
copyright tolerates a limited proprietary right to creative works of authorship in
order to encourage creation of works that ultimately redound to the benefit of
the public.23 Serving the public interest is more than an afterthought; it is the
animating force behind granting limited proprietary rights to creative works.
The Copyright Clause authorizes Congress “To promote the Progress of Science
. . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings . . . .”24 As a product of positive law, the copyright bargain
is an instrument that exists for an express purpose: to promote the progress of
science, learning, and creativity.25 Thus the public’s interest is the centerpiece
of the copyright schema.
U.S. copyright is premised on economic incentives, rather than on natural
rights.26 The copyright bargain is struck because we theorize it will encourage
socially optimal production of creative works.27 Creative works are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. Such works are non-rivalrous because they cannot
be used up when consumed.28 And such works are nonexcludable because non-

23. E.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214–15 (2003) (discussing the copyright “bargain”
established between the public and the author).
26. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“[C]opyright is the creature
of the Federal statute passed in the exercise of the power vested in the Congress. As this Court has
repeatedly said, the Congress did not sanction an existing right, but created a new one.”); Am.
Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907) (“In this country it is well settled that
property in copyright is the creation of the Federal statute passed in the exercise of the power vested
in Congress by the Federal Constitution in article I, § 8.”); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661
(1834) (“[C]ongress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing rights.”).
See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 12; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
27. See Christopher Jon Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives: What We Know (and
Don’t), 55 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 452 (2017).
28. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004).
Information cannot be depleted, however; in economic terms, its consumption is
nonrivalrous. It simply cannot be ‘used up.’ Indeed, copying information actually
multiplies the available resources, not only by making a new physical copy but by
spreading the idea and therefore permitting others to use and enjoy it. The result is that
rather than a tragedy, an information commons is a ‘comedy’ in which everyone benefits.
Id.
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paying consumers cannot be prevented from accessing them.29 These works are
essentially a public good; exclusive rights are necessary to prevent the free rider
problem, which would defeat an incentive to produce the creative works.30
Intellectual property rights step in to prevent underproduction of these valuable
works.31 As the Supreme Court explained, “By establishing a marketable right
to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas.”32 By design, the system “generate[s] both
incentives and spillovers.”33
Creators are given monopoly power over their works because the costs
associated with creation are not shared by copyists. But copyright policy should
create sufficient incentives, not maximum incentives.34 The Constitution both
grants and limits Congress’s authority to offer exclusive rights; these rights are
only for “limited Times,” only to “Authors,” and only to “Writings.”35 While
this constitutional grant has been given liberal construction, the internal
limitations nonetheless remain. Copyright is not an absolute right. The limits
on the enumerated statutory rights—like fair use, first sale exhaustion, and
compulsory licenses—dispel a vision of copyright as an absolute right.36
Copyrights are intended “to Promote the Progress of Science,” and copyright

29. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295
(1970); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1700 (1988).
30. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 12–13; Landes & Posner, supra note 26; Lemley,
supra note 28, at 29 (“The traditional economic justification for intellectual property is well known.
Ideas are public goods: they can be copied freely and used by anyone who is aware of them without
depriving others of their use.”). But see Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods:
Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 164 (2002) (“But not all ‘public goods’ are the
proper province of copyright.”); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012) (challenging copyright’s assumption that external
incentives are necessary).
31. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1611 (1982) (“Because it is
difficult or expensive to prevent ‘free riders’ from using such goods, public goods usually will be
under-produced if left to the private market.”).
32. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
33. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 284
(2007).
34. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 125 (1999) (“[T]he goal of intellectual property [law] is
only to provide the ‘optimal incentive,’ not the largest incentive possible. Past a certain point, it
would be inefficient to withhold works from the public domain in order to provide ever-decreasing
‘incentives’ to their creators.”); Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN’S
J.L. COMM. 635, 638 (1996) (“[W]e protect intellectual property to provide the owner sufficient
incentive to produce such property. ‘Sufficient incentive,’ however, is something less than ‘perfect
control.’”).
35. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991).
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policy should be interpreted in that light.37 Copyright should promote learning,
not inhibit it. Copyright’s purpose is not to amass private fortunes, but rather to
promote the public welfare. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”38
To balance competing interests, copyright is a policy-minded compromise.39
Copyright’s exclusive rights—granted to stimulate production and public
dissemination of creative works—have costs. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “[t]he more artistic protection is favored, the more
technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright
law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.”40 Thus every right to exclude
impairs the liberty and freedom of others.
Copyright imposes significant economic and noneconomic costs on free
markets and free expression. Copyright restricts free expression interests of
downstream creators and secondary users. Copyright is also a financial
instrument that enables supra-competitive market rates.41 Exclusive rights
artificially create scarcity of a public good. The economic distortions caused by
the rightsholder’s supra-competitive prices can, in turn, create deadweight
losses—to the extent there is unmet need at supra-competitive prices.42 Because
of the speech-abridging and market-distorting effects of copyright’s monopoly,
copyright policy is all about tradeoffs.43 As explained below, I believe copyright
policy is out of balance and in need of recalibration.

37. Id. at 349–50 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
38. Id. at 349 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
39. The modern Copyright Act is the product of much debate and compromise. The current
legal framework was negotiated by industry insiders between the 1950s and 1970s. See Barbara
Ringer, Authors’ Rights in the Electronic Age: Beyond the Copyright Act of 1976, 1 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1981); Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 477, 477 (1977).
40. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) (citations omitted).
41. Cf. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in
Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 36 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (“A patent is essentially a financial
instrument that entitles its bearer to achieve greater than competitive market rates of return on
investment.”).
42. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1197, 1206–07 (1996) (discussing deadweight loss that results from monopoly power over
distribution of existing works).
43. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 4, at 804 (“Most economic analyses of intellectual
property focus on tradeoffs associated with exclusivity.”); Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation
Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV.
951, 1014 (2012) (“When it comes to the copyright-innovation intersection, courts and
commentators to date have agreed that society’s main policy goal is to trade off incentivizing
authorship and incentivizing innovation.”).
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Since the first Copyright Act of 1790, copyright’s scope, duration, and
damages have been ever expanding.44 Scholars have noted that copyright today
is “both wider (in terms of coverage) and deeper (in terms of time)” than ever.45
Some have described this rights enlargement as a “one-way [copyright]
ratchet.”46 The optimistic view sees copyright’s expansion “as a series of
efficiency-promoting adjustments,” whereas the pessimistic view sees the
expansion as a classic public choice pathology.47 Regardless whether you
conclude that we have struck a “happier balance” between competing interests,48
or that it is evidence of legislative capture,49 it is undeniable that copyright is
longer and stronger than ever before.
Today, copyright subsists in all “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium[,]” and it grants the copyright owner exclusive rights over
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and display.50 The duration
of copyright terms has been extended eleven times between 1963 and 1998.51
Copyright initially offered a fourteen year term of protection, which could be
renewed once; it now offers protection for the life of the author plus an additional

44. Compare Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), with Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012).
45. L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 264
(1992). See also Amanda Reid, Claiming the Copyright, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 444 (2016)
(“Today, our formality-optional system has swept within the bounds of copyright far more works
for far longer than was initially contemplated. And copyright’s bounds are larger than ever. Not
only has the subject matter of copyright expanded, but the rights have expanded too.”).
46. E.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Operating Software, Copyright Misuse,
and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 161, 163 (1999) (“Congress has a ratchet for copyright
protection that sends it in only one direction—more for owners of existing copyrights and less for
current and future authors and for the public generally.”); Jessica Litman, Convergence of
Paradigms and Cultures: War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 (2002) (“Recently,
copyright legislation has seemed to be a one-way ratchet, increasing the subject matter, scope, and
duration of copyright with every amendment.”); David McGowan, Why the First Amendment
Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 282 (2004) (“Many copyright scholars
object to the way Congress deals with their subject. With good reason, they feel Congress wields
a copyright ratchet: terms get longer, and the scope of rights gets wider, but never the reverse.”);
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 543 (2004) (“Legally, then, copyright has been a one-way ratchet
covering more works and granting more rights for a longer time.”).
47. Wu, supra note 6, at 291; see also Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success
vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 757 (2001).
48. Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61,
64 (2002).
49. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 860–61 (1987) (recounting how incumbents have proposed and drafted various amendments
to the Copyright Act).
50. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2012).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). See also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1042 n.38 (2005).
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seventy years after the author’s death.52 Not only have the type of works
protected by copyright broadened, but the rights that attach to these works have
also been enlarged.53 Copyright is no longer limited to protecting maps, charts,
and books; it now protects a range of works, including photographs,
choreography, architectural drawings, sound recordings, and computer
software.54 Copyright is no longer limited to protecting against verbatim and
near-verbatim copying; it now protects a range of activities including derivative
creations, public performances, and public displays.55 Formalities, like affixing
a copyright notice and registering a work, are no longer required.56 The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act makes circumvention of digital rights management
illegal.57 And statutory damages for copyright infringement can run as high as
$150,000 per work for willful infringement.58
As technology has changed our relationship with copyrighted works,
incumbent rightsholders have pushed for the scope of copyright to change.59
New technology has made copying and distributing easier. To combat threats
of piracy from new technology, copyright holders regularly push for greater
protections. For example, over the past century, incumbents have urged
Congress to revise the copyright laws to extend exclusive rights to new
technologies like phonographs, film, cable transmission, and internet radio.60
Historically copyright has had trouble keeping pace with new, unforeseen
technologies.61 Application of copyright to breakthrough technologies is often

52. Compare Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), with 17 U.S.C.
§ 302.
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. See also Reid, supra note 45, at 444.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
56. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §§ 7–9, 102 Stat.
2853, 2857-59 (1988). See also Reid, supra note 45, at 425 (arguing that one way to re-balance
the interests of copyright holders and users is by reintroducing formalities that incentivize copyright
holders to claim their works).
57. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 1201, 1203, 1204, 112
Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998) (codified in various sections of 17 U.S.C.).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
59. Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 64, 69 (2014).
60. See, e.g., id. (“As increasingly effective copying technology was developed and
disseminated—such as offset lithography, xerography, and digitization—legal exclusivity was
called upon to fill a greater and greater gap between the initial cost of creation and the cost of
subsequent dissemination.”); Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1495–96 (“With the 1976 Copyright
Act, a Congress weary of recurring demands to revise copyright law in light of new technologies—
e.g., phonographs, film, radio, cable transmission, etc.—thought it had guarded the statute against
ossification and obsolescence via technology-neutral defaults.”).
61. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (“Copyright laws have struggled through the years to
keep pace with emerging technology.”). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY:
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 24, 25 (rev. ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2003);
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 57 (2d ed. 2006); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control
Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (2001).
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uncertain.62 To avoid the problems of continual adjustments and the risk of
obsolescence, policymakers aimed for modern copyright to be technologyneutral.63 The goal of technology neutrality is to “future-proof” copyright such
that it is adaptable to new, currently unknown technologies.64 But, in fact,
copyright has not been made future-proof.65
Copyright’s application to new technology remains uncertain.66 Over the
years, the Supreme Court has been called upon to resolve whether to apply
copyright to new technology, including internet retransmissions of broadcast
television programs, file sharing over peer-to-peer networks, home video
recording devices (VCRs), player pianos, and photographs.67 So despite the goal
62. Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1835–36 (“In copyright law, breakthrough technologies make
it more difficult to apply existing rules by analogy. Even when courts seek to apply the relatively
bright-line rules of copyright doctrine, the exact entitlement of rights may be surprisingly uncertain
when applied to a novel technology.”).
63. See Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1511–15.
64. Jake Linford, Improving Technology Neutrality Through Compulsory Licensing, 100
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 126, 128 (2016) (“Advocates of technology neutrality in copyright law
emphasize that a technology neutral statute should be somewhat future proof—adaptable to new
technologies even if the enacting Congress couldn’t hazard a guess at what those technologies
might be.”). See also Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 270–76 (2007) (noting futureproofing and equivalence); Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1518.
That all new copyright-using technologies are subject to copyright law gave the 1976 Act
the appearance of flexibility in the face of increasingly rapid technological change. Only
authors or users unhappy with the law’s application would feel the need to lobby
Congress for technology-specific treatment. Neutrality was a blunt tool, but it appeared
to guard copyright law against obsolescence, even if over time it became apparent that
the law was often too general to be adequately tailored to new technologies. Indeed, four
decades later, technology neutrality continues to be touted as value-maximizing in
copyright law.
Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1518 (citations omitted).
65. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1497 (“Technology-neutral provisions have failed to futureproof copyright law, leading to numerous quickly outmoded revisions. Neutral provisions also
have magnified copyright’s complexity by driving judicial inconsistency and increasing the role of
uncertain ex post exceptions.”).
66. Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1841 (noting “the dynamic and unpredictable nature of
technological innovation makes it difficult for lawmakers to predict or anticipate forthcoming
inventions” because “past innovations are not always reliable indicators of what is to come”)
(citation omitted).
67. See generally American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2498 (2014)
(internet retransmission); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (peer-to-peer
file sharing); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (electronic reproductions); Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (software); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (home video recorders); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (photocopying); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
415 U.S. 394 (1974) (cable retransmission); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392
U.S. 390 (1968) (same); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (applied art); Buck v. Jewell-La Salle
Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931) (radio); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (motion
picture version of novel Ben Hur); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)
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of future-proofing, modern copyright has required judicial interpretations and
legislative amendments to address technological advances.68 Each new
technological advance has forced an adjustment of the scope of copyright.69
Notwithstanding future-proof aspirations, copyright’s expansion is ill-fit for
current use and potential future technology. It has proven hard to anticipate and
keep up with future technology.70 Mark Twain could hardly have envisioned ebooks, and our Congress is at a similar disadvantage.71 Anticipating the future
value of innovations is notoriously difficult.72 Technological innovation injects
“unknown unknowns” into the calculus.73 One of the shortcomings of
attempting to future-proof is, as Brad Greenberg noted, that “we cannot predict
whether applying a law to a new technology will promote—or undermine—the
law’s policy goals.”74
Another shortcoming of attempting to future-proof is that modern copyright
is built around existing technologies and implicitly discriminates against new
technologies.75 By allowing incumbents to dictate copyright policy, Congress
has entrenched a preference for extant technologies. This bias for current
(player piano rolls); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photographs).
See also Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1496 n.7.
68. Burk, supra note 59, at 69 (“Radio, broadcast television, xerography, cable, digital
transmission, and other communication technologies have all left their mark on the statute as
Congress has responded to the demands of copyright holders, resulting in the cumulative,
technologically defined amendment of the statute over time.”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 278–79 (1989) (tracing legislative
amendments to the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts in response to advances in communication
technologies).
69. Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1835 (“Whenever technological advances create new means
of making copies or communicating copyrighted works, difficult questions arise as to how
boundaries should be drawn around new uses of content created by the new technology.”).
70. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1527.
[W]hen Congress attempts to draft laws with an eye toward an unknown future, it does
so from the vantage point of contemporary technological limitations, crafting
technology-neutral laws with extant technology in mind. Like the nineteenth-century
farmer who imagines a sharper plow but is unable to foresee the combustion engine,
Congress imagines linear advances from extant technology.
Id. (citations omitted).
71. See id. at 1519 (“At the urging of frustrated copyright owners and even the Register of
Copyrights, the statute has been amended thirty-one times to add or revise technology-specific
provisions. Revisions have added complexity to the 1976 Act, and on occasion without clear
benefit to copyright owners or users.”).
72. Id. at 1524–26 (recounting examples of “miscalculations” that “look abjectly
shortsighted”).
73. Id. at 1526 (“Technology neutrality is based on the premise that technology-neutral laws
can adequately anticipate known unknowns. The trouble is: technological spikes inject unknown
unknowns.”).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1497 (2016) (“[T]he 1976 Act’s technology-neutral defaults were drafted with
existing technologies (and business models) in mind, resulting in inefficient and unjustified
discrimination against new technologies.”).
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technologies is reflected in copyright’s technology-specific exemptions, like
compulsory licenses for cable retransmissions,76 jukeboxes,77 mechanical
reproductions of musical works,78 and qualifying webcasters.79 Far from being
neutral, bias is baked into our technology, as well as our copyright policy.80
Our copyright policy has enabled technology entrenchment, which ensures
incumbent distributors maintain dominance.81 This bias is manifest and forced
into relief after the emergence of a paradigm-shifting innovation.82 But the
emergence of a paradigm-shifting innovation can be thwarted by the threat of a
copyright lawsuit. Litigation risks entrench incumbents by hampering new
innovations and legitimate uses of copyrighted works.83 New technology
76. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2012).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). See also Amanda Reid, The Power of Music: Applying First
Amendment Scrutiny to Copyright Regulation of Internet Radio, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233
(2012) (arguing the copyright regulations that limit the number and arrangement of songs a
webcaster may transmit within a three-hour period infringe First Amendment interests); Amanda
S. Reid, Play It Again, Sam: Webcasters’ Sound Recording Complement as an Unconstitutional
Restraint on Free Speech, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 317 (2004) (analyzing whether
copyright regulations on webcaster transmissions would pass First Amendment scrutiny).
80. E.g., CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3 (2016) (arguing the “math-powered applications
powering the data economy” are created by “fallible human beings” and “many of these models
encoded human prejudice, misunderstanding, and bias into the software systems that increasingly
manage[] our lives”); SARA WACHTER-BOETTCHER, TECHNICALLY WRONG: SEXIST APPS,
BIASED ALGORITHMS, AND OTHER THREATS OF TOXIC TECH 6 (2017) (“The more I started paying
attention to how tech products are designed, the more I started noticing how often they’re full of
blind spots, biases, and outright ethical blunders—and how often those oversights can exacerbate
unfairness and leave vulnerable people out.”).
81. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217, 1262–63 (2005)
(suggesting that technology neutrality may have been about technology entrenchment, to ensure
the incumbent distributors could remain powerful even when new, more efficient vehicles arose for
disseminating content); Wendy Seltzer, The Imperfect is the Enemy of Good: Anticircumvention
versus Open User Innovation, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 960 (2010).
If the incumbent can [block new, disruptive technology] using intellectual property, it
can preserve its own position for a bit longer at the expense of a public denied the
opportunities of technological improvement. It takes less foresight to seek stability by
blocking others from innovating than to innovate for oneself.
Seltzer, supra note 81, at 960.
82. Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 24, 28 (2012).
Time and again we realize that a law that seemed to be technology-neutral at one point
(usually the time of its legislation), is in fact based on a particular technology, albeit in a
general manner. We often realize the technological mindset that is embedded in the law
only once a new technological paradigm replaces the previous one.
Id.
83. A recent study, citing conversations with hundreds of startups, explained that “[a]s the
curation and distribution of creative content becomes an increasingly ripe source of innovation,
old-fashioned notions of what it means to make a copy—and how infringement of copyright is
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challenges conventional understandings of what it means to reproduce or
distribute a work. But uncertain application of copyright law has deterred
socially beneficial innovations.84
Copyright lawsuits are powerful deterrents, in part, because of the risk and
uncertainty of statutory damages. Current copyright law entitles a rightsholder
to recover both actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer.85 Or,
in lieu of actual damages and profits, a copyright owner may elect to recover
statutory damages.86 A plaintiff may elect statutory damages in lieu of actual
damages at any time before the final judgment is delivered.87 Thus, at trial, a
plaintiff has the option to prove actual damages or to skirt this burden and seek
an amount within a statutory range.88
While the statute offers some general guidelines, a court ultimately “has wide
discretion in setting the amount of statutory damages,” as the Ninth Circuit
noted.89 The statute provides that a court may award an amount between $750
and $30,000 for each work infringed “as the court considers just.”90 If the court
concludes the infringement was “committed willfully,” the court may increase
the award to $150,000.91 Or, if the court concludes the infringement was
innocent—because the “infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright”—the court may
decrease the award to “not less than $200.”92 The statute thus sets out three
brackets of damages: innocent ($200–$30,000), non-innocent-and-non-willful
($750–$30,000), and willful ($750–$150,000).
Statutory damages are commonly understood to have a two-fold purpose: (1)
assure adequate compensation to the copyright owner for her injury, and (2)
deter infringement.93 As the Copyright Office indicated in a 1961 report: “[T]he

enforced—lead to many potentially great business models being blocked.” Edward Lee, CopyrightExempt Nonprofits: A Simple Proposal to Spur Innovation, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1433, 1441 (2013).
84. Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1841.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages
suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.”).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Curet-Velazquez v. ACEMLA de Puerto Rico, Inc., 656 F.3d 47, 57–58 (1st Cir.
2011) (allowing plaintiff to request relief in the alternative, either actual damages or statutory
damages, and ultimately elect statutory damages in plaintiff’s proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law).
89. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
92. Id.
93. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the Registrar of Copyrights
on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 102-103 (Comm. Print 1961). Accord Feltner
v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998) (statutory damages “may serve
purposes traditionally associated with legal relief, such as compensation and punishment”). Note
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value of a copyright is, by its nature, difficult to establish, and the loss caused
by an infringement is equally hard to determine. As a result, actual damages are
often conjectural, and may be impossible or prohibitively expensive to prove.”94
Additionally, deterrence is presumed necessary, otherwise users may adopt a
take-now-and-pay-only-if-caught mentality.95
Notwithstanding the laudable goals of statutory damages, there is growing
criticism of the current array.96 Similar cases have resulted in wildly disparate
damage awards.97 Uncertain application of statutory damages can over-deter
uses of copyrighted works. Scholars note that statutory damage “awards have
too often been arbitrary and inconsistent, and sometimes grossly excessive.”98
Several notable cases “received considerable publicity.”99 In July 2009, a jury
awarded statutory damages of $675,000 against a college student found liable
for downloading and sharing thirty songs online.100 A month prior, in June 2009,
a jury awarded statutory damages of $1.92 million against a single mother found
liable for downloading and sharing twenty-four songs online.101 And in 2004, a
jury awarded statutory damages of $19.7 million, even though the defendant
argued “the actual harm” from the infringements was only $59,000.102 The risk
of sizable statutory damages undeniably chills even legitimate uses of
that statutory damages are available only if the copyright owner registered her work prior to the
infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012).
94. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 102 (Comm. Print 1961).
95. See, e.g., Dream Dealers Music v. Parker, 924 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
(“Foremost, the court must award an amount that will put the defendant on notice that it costs more
to violate the copyright law than to obey it.”).
96. See, e.g., J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal FileSharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright
Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526 (2004) (arguing “the punitive effect of even the minimum
statutory damage award, when aggregated across a large number of similar acts, can grow so
enormous that it becomes an unconstitutionally excessive punishment”); Jeffrey Stavroff, Damages
in Dissonance: The “Shocking” Penalty for Illegal Music File-Sharing, 39 CAP. U.L. REV. 659,
662 (2011) (arguing “recent statutory damages awards are unfair, arbitrary, and contrary to the
Framers’ intention that copyright provide incentives to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good”).
97. Pamela Samuelson et al., Statutory Damages: A Rarity in Copyright Laws Internationally,
But For How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 529, 553 n.101 (2013) (comparing cases).
98. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy
in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 510 (2009).
99. Dep’t of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and
Statutory Damages: Copyright Policy, Creativity, And Innovation In The Digital Economy 70–71
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf.
100. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 489–91, 493 (1st Cir. 2011)
(reinstating jury’s award of $675,000 in statutory damages, reversing a decision by the district court
to reduce it to $67,500).
101. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2012)
(reinstituting the first jury’s damages verdict of $220,000, after the second jury awarded statutory
damages of $1,920,000 and the third jury awarded statutory damages of $1,500,000).
102. Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (D. Md. 2004).
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copyrighted works.103 Capitalizing on this uncertainty, copyright “trolls” have,
as the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force noted, used
the “the threat of statutory damages to turn litigation threats into a profit
center.”104
Litigation threats have also been used to enjoin robust discussions on matters
of public importance.105 Copyright has be used to stifle free speech.106 As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, “some restriction on expression is the
inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright.”107 But, as the Court
explained, “copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech

103. Alan E. Garfield, Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages to Promote Speech, 38 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2010) (“[A]s long as the wild card of punitive damages remains in a copyright
owner’s deck of remedies, the risk of moving forward will often seem too great.”). See also Dep’t
of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the
Digital
Economy
52
(July
2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf.
Much public attention has focused on the size of the awards in the two infringement cases
against individual file sharers that have gone to trial. In both cases, after large awards by
juries within the statutory range had been reduced by the district courts, they were
eventually reinstated by the Courts of Appeals.
Id.
104. See Dep’t of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, White Paper on Remixes, First Sale,
and Statutory Damages: Copyright Policy, Creativity, And Innovation In The Digital Economy 75–
76 (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf.
105. See, e.g., Tehranian, supra note 17, at 250–51; Travis, supra note 5, at 725 (“Public
figures such as political candidates, public officials, and celebrities have increasingly looked to
copyright law to prevent criticism or parody of their actions or works.”).
Whether it is a creationist group using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)
to force the takedown of critical materials put online by evolutionists; abortion-rights
activists bringing infringement litigation to enjoin speech by pro-life forces; military
personnel using copyright claims to suppress photographs documenting human-rights
abuses; or a political commentator suing to vindicate the exclusive rights to recordings
of his shows as a means of suppressing criticism of his hate-filled rant, examples of this
disingenuous use of copyright law abound.
Tehranian, supra note 17, at 250–51 (citations omitted).
106. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 399.
Ordinary theories of copyright have been used to suppress political speech ranging from
a successful suit against an unauthorized translation of Hitler’s Mein Kampf designed to
awaken Americans to the threat posed by Nazi ideology to less weighty, but still notably
successful, lawsuits against political uses of music inconsistent with composers’ beliefs.
Id.
107. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 327–28 (2012); accord Andrew Koppelman, Veil of
Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism In Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 647, 653 (2013).
Copyright is a source of income for authors, so it creates an incentive for them to produce
speech. But it does so by stifling other speech. When the law suppresses pirated editions,
it keeps the work out of the hands of some people who would otherwise consume it. We
are trading some speech for other speech.
Koppelman, supra note 107, at 653.
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principles” because “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment
accommodations,” like fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy.108
Fair use is a bulwark of free speech values; our free speech culture cannot
survive without it. This relationship has been described by Judge M. Margaret
McKeown as the “ying and yang of copyright and the First Amendment.”109 Fair
use allows use of copyrighted works without permission from the copyright
holder.110 Congress has codified four non-exclusive fair use factors: (1) the
purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality used; and (4) the effect of the use on markets for the
copyrighted work.111 To keep pace with copyright’s expansion, I argue that fair
use must also expand in order to maintain the copyright balance. In Part IV, I
offer a suggestion for recalibrating fair use.
Promoting free expression is intertwined with promoting innovation.112
Copyright can be both the engine of free speech and a tool of censorship.
Copyright can also be used to foster or thwart innovations. Copyright
policymaking demands a clear and honest appraisal of the current balance. As
such, we must ask if copyright policy is appropriately calibrated to account for
these tradeoffs. Because of the costs to innovation and free expression, I argue
it is not.

108. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
109. Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 16 (2015).
110. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; Stewart
v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,
447–48 (1984). Fair use has since been codified in Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Copyright Act of 1976 § 107, 90 Stat. at 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107). See also
Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1838–39 (“One of the most prominent legal issues in copyright law
pertains to fair use: does the new use fall within the legal category of free use, or is it within the
exclusive right of copyright owners and therefore in need of a license?”).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
112. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427,
438 (2009). See also Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures
of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000)
(“Technology now makes possible the attainment of decentralization and democratization by
enabling small groups of constituents and individuals to become users—participants in the
production of their information environment—rather than by lightly regulating concentrated
commercial mass media to make them better serve individuals conceived as passive consumers.”).
[W]e cannot easily separate values of free expression from the goals of promoting
widespread and decentralized innovation and new forms of information production and
information services. To put it another way, we best serve free speech values by
decentralizing and promoting innovation, by letting lots of different people experiment
with a wide variety of new ways of communicating, sharing information, associating,
and building things together.
Balkin, supra note 112, at 438.
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II. COPYRIGHT POLICY & INNOVATION
Conventional economic theory suggests that the creative destruction cycle is
the engine of long-term economic growth.113 Economist Joseph Schumpeter
described capitalism as a “perennial gale of creative destruction.”114 The
Schumpeterian cycle of innovation and growth typically involves a dominant,
incumbent firm that is overwhelmed by a new, disruptive innovation, which then
upends the balance of power.115 In the process of creative destruction the
“capitalist engine,” according to Schumpeter, keeps moving by “incessantly
revolutioniz[ing] the economic structure . . . [by] incessantly destroying the old
one, incessantly creating a new one.”116 In turn, the new firm may become
dominant, and subject to a subsequent cycle of creative destruction by another
new innovation.
But after the creative destruction cycle, the newly established interest often
seeks to protect its now dominant status through legal and regulatory
protections.117 This “transition from entrepreneur” to incumbent can be
“breathtakingly fast.”118 For example, in the electrical lighting industry, it took
less than a decade for Thomas Edison to transition from a “maverick” promoting
the feasibility of incandescent lighting to an outspoken critic of the “dangerous”
alternating current innovation.119
History teaches that newly dominant forces have often pushed for greater
copyright protections to maintain their advantage. Legal scholars have observed
this pattern:
At the turn of the last century, the music publishers selling sheet music
came into conflict with the manufacturers of a new technological
device, the piano roll. In the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s, the music
publishers clashed with radio companies. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
movie studios fought with the makers of videocassette recorders
(VCRs). In the early 2000s, the record labels resisted digital
distribution of music and sought to squelch or otherwise control the
software companies that offered file sharing software.120
113. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–
86 (1942).
114. Id. at 84.
115. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 79–81, 132–34 (1997); Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen,
Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, HARV. BUS. REV. (1995); Spencer Weber Waller &
Matthew Sag, Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2223, 2226 (2015).
116. SCHUMPETER, supra note 113, at 83.
117. E.g., DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, AND
WEALTH FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET 16–18 (2001).
118. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 872 n.141 (1990).
119. Id.
120. DiCola & Sag, supra note 7, at 175 (citations omitted).
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The now incumbent forces have the opportunity and the cost advantage
needed to erect barriers to independent entry.121 Whether it was television
broadcasters trying to block cable television or existing radio companies trying
to block “low-power” FM stations, incumbents have a long history of leveraging
copyright to block competing technologies.122
Copyright barriers can prevent creative destruction and hamper the cycle of
progress. Incumbents have a strong, selfish instinct to bury disruptive
innovations.123 But to further economic growth, the creative destruction cycle
must continue. Economic growth’s pains and gains are inextricable.
Innovation is the process that drives competition and economic growth.124
Some innovations involve dramatic improvements whereas others are merely
incremental.125 Innovation often occurs in fits and starts. Innovation, like
evolution, can be messy and nonlinear.126 The current digital media successes,
for example, have resulted from several rounds of iterative innovations, not just
a single innovative advance.127
Newcomers are often responsible for cutting-edge, economic advances.128
Entrepreneurs and start-ups are key players in the creative destruction process
that fosters innovation.129 In fact, scholars note that “[f]rom 1980 [to] 2005,
121. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 33 (2010) (“Market
leaders in the entertainment and information businesses have learned to use copyright legislation
as an opportunity to erect market barriers to block their nascent competition.”).
122. Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV.
123, 139 (2006).
123. Id. at 140 (“Since few firms plan for their own death, even if their death is in the public
interest, the temptation to bury a disruptive innovation may be strong indeed.”).
124. Waller & Sag, supra note 115, at 2246 (“Innovation is a process that does not end. In the
long run innovation, is the most important driver of both competition and economic growth.”).
125. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1525 (“Some innovations are subtle and frequent, like
improvements to the typewriter; others are dramatic and paradigm shifting, like the computer
processor.”).
126. Mike Masnick, When You Let Incumbents Veto Innovation, You Get Less Innovation,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 27, 28 (2013) (“The process of innovation is messy and unpredictable.”).
127. Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 667 (2014) (“The
success of Silicon Valley enterprises has often been a result not just of a single initial inspiration,
but of successive rounds of serial innovation within a single firm.”).
128. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 964–65
(2016). In the Schumpeterian model:
Entrepreneurs are special because they create ‘new combinations,’ namely by
introducing new products, developing new methods of production, devising new business
models, and creating new markets—creations that confront and eventually defeat
previously existing economic orders. By implementing innovations, entrepreneurs
destroy the basis for the old economy while paving the way to a new economic order of
prosperity and welfare.
Id.
129. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE
GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 31 (2002); accord William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship in
Economic Theory, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 64 (1968).
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firms less than five years old accounted for nearly all net job growth in the
country, and in 2007 alone, these same young firms accounted for nearly twothirds of job creation.”130 And these newcomers are more likely to produce
disruptive technologies.131 Such technological progress has been the centerpiece
of domestic economic growth.132 According to the Obama White House, “from
1948 [to] 2012 over half of the total increase in U.S. productivity growth, a key
driver of economic growth, came from innovation and technological change.”133
The innovation process involves creative destruction. When online travel
sites (e.g., Expedia) supersede travel agencies and when online entertainment
streaming services (e.g., Netflix) replace movie rental stores (e.g., Blockbuster),
we have creative destruction:134 superior products and services replace and
destroy the old ones.135 These new technologies—which arguably produce
better products—are good for both society and the economy.136
But disruptive technology can face serious limitations when confronted with
copyright law. Copyright policy is inextricably intertwined with new

130. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 128, at 963–64.
131. ARNOLD KLING & NICK S CHULZ, FROM POVERTY TO PROSPERITY: INTANGIBLE ASSETS,
HIDDEN LIABILITIES AND THE LASTING TRIUMPH OVER SCARCITY 8 (2009) (“Often, innovation
is the result of the unplanned trial-and-error learning that takes place among new enterprises, rather
than the organized research and development efforts of large organizations.”). See also DiCola &
Sag, supra note 7, at 179 (“[D]ue to its potential to disrupt the status quo, new copyright technology
is almost never developed by the dominant content owners of the day. New technologies for the
dissemination of copyrighted works, by their very nature, tend to come from outsiders.”).
132. See, e.g., NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (Joseph E.
Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986).
133. Fact Sheet: The White House Releases New Strategy for American Innovation, Announces
Areas of Opportunity from Self-Driving Cars to Smart Cities, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SEC’Y (Oct. 21, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/21/factsheet-white-house-releases-new-strategy-american-innovation.
134. Waller & Sag, supra note 115, at 2223–24 (detailing examples of modern creative
destruction: “email has upended the economics of the postal service, Craigslist has devastated
newspaper classified ads, online shopping has imperiled bricks-and-mortar retail, and the
smartphone has relegated former mobile handset market leaders, such as Nokia and Blackberry, to
obscurity”).
135. Rather than creating a new market, there is a risk that some new technology may simply
free ride and cannibalize old technology without offering a superior substitute. See Barak Y.
Orbach, Indirect Free Riding on the Wheels of Commerce: Dual-Use Technologies and Copyright
Liability, 57 EMORY L.J. 409, 455 (2008).
136. Seltzer, supra note 81, at 963.
While disruption is painful to those whose businesses are leapfrogged, it generally
benefits end-users. Through competition, they get access to a wider range of products,
better tailored to their needs in feature selection or price. Customers who cannot attract
the attention of a major producer, on whose scale they would be just a speck, may be able
to find a supplier elsewhere who sees them as opportunities to break in to a new market.
Some would-be disruptors fail, of course, but the larger number of innovators who can
try when barriers to entry are lower gives more opportunities for unexpected successes.
Id.
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communications technologies.137 Copyright can deter innovation because the
application of the law to breakthrough technologies is often uncertain.138
Copyright policy, therefore, creates winners and losers in the marketplace.139
Copyright allows incumbents to lock out competition.140 As an exclusive right
(i.e., the right to exclude), the copyright holder can deny a competitor access to
“an essential input,” namely the copyrighted work.141 As a financial instrument,
copyright enables supra-competitive market rates.142
Exclusive rights
artificially create scarcity of a public good. And the economic distortions caused
by the rightsholder’s supra-competitive prices can, in turn, create deadweight
losses—to the extent there is unmet need at supra-competitive prices.143
Copyright not only blocks price competition, but it also blocks project
development and innovation.144 Copyright has historically lagged behind
technological innovations.145 It isn’t always clear ex ante the extent to which
copyright law will apply—or if it will apply at all.146 While the law offers some
accommodations for new technology, such as safe harbors and fair use, their
application is uncertain.147 The contours of copyright’s statutory language
137. Burk, supra note 59, at 69 (“[C]opyright has evolved to place exclusive rights at the level
of activities such as reproduction and distribution of copies, or transmission of performances, which
are largely technological activities.”).
138. Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1836 (“In copyright law, breakthrough technologies make it
more difficult to apply existing rules by analogy. Even when courts seek to apply the relatively
bright-line rules of copyright doctrine, the exact entitlement of rights may be surprisingly uncertain
when applied to a novel technology.”).
139. Lee, supra note 11, at 808 (“In the successful fair use cases above, all of the technologies
continued. In the unsuccessful cases, all of the specific technologies ceased to exist.”); Randal C.
Picker, Copyright and Technology: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 2013 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 41
(2013) (noting “[c]opyright can kill technology”).
140. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
249 (2005).
141. Wu, supra note 6, at 295.
142. Cf. Abbott, supra note 41, at 36 (“A patent is essentially a financial instrument that entitles
its bearer to achieve greater than competitive market rates of return on investment.”).
143. E.g., Sterk, supra note 42, at 1206 (discussing deadweight loss that results from monopoly
power over distribution of existing works).
144. Wu, supra note 122, at 137.
145. Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1840 (“Because innovation is rapid and unpredictable, the
adaptation of copyright law lags far behind the introduction of new technological advancements.”);
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 566 (1998) (“[T]hat technological developments outpace the rate
of legal change poses another particular problem for intellectual property rights; the law always
lags behind the technology.”).
146. See Chander, supra note 127, at 658 (“Consider the graveyard of dot-com enterprises,
felled not by flawed monetization plans, but by copyright law: MP3.com, ICraveTV.com, Aimster,
Grokster, and, most famously, Napster.”).
147. Lee, supra note 83, at 1444 (“U.S. copyright law has three primary mechanisms designed
to allow some ways for technology developers to develop new uses of copyrighted content: (1) the
DMCA safe harbors, (2) fair use, and (3) the Sony safe harbor.”). See also Amanda Reid,
Considering Fair Use: DMCA’s Take Down & Repeat Infringers Policies, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y
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continue to be interpreted and interpolated by judicial opinions.148 This lag
between new technology and judicial interpretation creates a period of legal
uncertainty.149 In turn, this uncertainty makes litigation more expensive and
risky.150
Entrepreneurs and start-ups are more likely to face a lawsuit for their
disruptive communication technology than established businesses.151 New
businesses have attempted to navigate the copyright maze trying to create noninfringing products, only to have the courts find their technology infringing.152
For example, Aereo, which sought to offer over-the-air television to internetconnected devices, designed its technology to conform to the requirements of
existing case law.153 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found the technology
infringing.154 Grokster, which sought to offer a non-infringing peer-to-peer
system, tried to learn from the Napster case.155 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
found the technology infringing.156 Experiences like these have discouraged
innovations in the digital sphere.157

1 (2019) (proposing reforms to the DMCA’s safe harbor regime to better safeguard fair use
interests).
148. See Litman, supra note 49, at 858.
149. Depoorter, supra note 8, at 1846 (noting “the introduction of a new technology is always
followed by a period of legal uncertainty in copyright law”); Wu, supra note 122, at 141 (“With
the arrival of every new industry—automobiles, airplanes, software, computers, internet auctions—
there is always some question as to whether or when intellectual property rights of some form
should attach.”).
150. John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of Secondary
Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1829 (2013).
151. E.g., Lee, supra note 83, at 1442. See also Seltzer, supra note 81, at 961 (“The
entertainment companies’ response to both VCR and MP3 as they became popular was similar to
their reaction to newer technologies under the DMCA: attempt to sue them anyway.”).
If a new Internet platform utilizes copyrighted content, as is often the case, the probability
is very high that a copyright lawsuit could be brought to challenge the new platform,
especially if it is making a new kind of use of the content. Even if the new use turns out
not to infringe, litigation could take a decade or more to decide the issue.
Lee, supra note 83, at 1442.
152. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1540 (“Napster, Aimster, and Grokster—three early peer-topeer file-sharing services—varied technologically but offered the same general service: enabling a
user to share a file in his possession with other users who wanted a copy . . . . [D]espite effectively
similar technology, Napster, Aimster, and Grokster each lost on a different basis.”) (citations
omitted).
153. See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008);
see also Olivier Sylvain, Disruption and Deference, 74 MD. L. REV. 715, 721–22 (2015) (providing
a background on Aereo’s technology).
154. Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014).
155. Burk, supra note 59, at 66 (“Grokster and KaZaa intentionally attempted to design around
the contours of technological liability as mapped out by the Ninth Circuit in the Napster decision.”).
156. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939–40 (2005).
157. Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 891,
916 (2012) (“Venture capital funding in the area of digital music fell significantly after the Napster
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But even when a new technology does not infringe, the risk of litigation is a
powerful disincentive for innovators.158 A copyright lawsuit is often an
existential threat to the survival of the firm. Not only are company trade secrets
put at risk of disclosure during the litigation process, but the costs—in time and
money—are enormous.159 Rarely can a defendant escape litigation before the
discovery phase and before accumulating sizable litigation costs.160 Indeed,
litigation can last for years and the legal fees can reach into the millions.161 For
example, YouTube’s successful defense against Viacom’s copyright lawsuit is
estimated to have generated over $100 million in legal costs.162 Only the best
capitalized firms are able to absorb such costs. Start-ups have comparatively
fewer resources than established industry groups and are less able to bear the
cost of litigating—even a meritorious case.163 Without a wealthy backer, like
Google, YouTube would not have survived the litigation process. 164
The threat of litigation and the uncertainty of litigation costs are substantial
barriers to innovation.165 Even when a defendant prevails, the costs can be
ruinous for a start-up company. The cost and time to defend can be
“backbreaking” even with “the most ironclad fair-use defenses.”166 The

decision. One VC explained that ‘it became a wasteland’ with ‘no music deals getting done.’”)
(citation omitted).
158. Matthew Le Merle et al., The Impact of U.S. Internet Copyright Regulations on EarlyStage
Investment
A
Quantitative
Study,
BOOZ&CO.
1,
6
(2011),
https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/uploads/Strategyand-Impact-US-Internet-CopyrightRegulations-Early-Stage-Investment.pdf. (“A large majority of angels and venture capitalists
support increased clarity in copyright law, especially if it would decrease the level of ambiguity
surrounding the probability of facing a lawsuit in cases of copyright infringement, as well as the
size of damages in the event of liability. Fully 80 percent report being uncomfortable investing in
business models in which the regulatory framework is ambiguous.”).
159. Blevins, supra note 150, at 1846 (“In pre-trial motions, Viacom filed a motion to compel
high volumes of information from YouTube—including ‘undisputed trade secret[s].’”).
160. See Tehranian, supra note 17, at 268.
161. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
829, 864 n.146 (2008) (“defending the lawsuit against the ReplayTV cost more than $1 million per
month in legal fees”).
162. Blevins, supra note 150, at 1832.
163. Id. at 1830–31.
164. Lee, supra note 83, at 1440.
Though startups are often the most innovative companies (because they are not saddled
with the innovator’s dilemma), they are least able to withstand a copyright lawsuit. That
plight leaves innovation in this area mainly to incumbents with sufficient financial
resources, such as Google (which also might acquire innovative startups as was the case
with Google’s acquisition of YouTube).
Id.
165. Blevins, supra note 150, at 1830 (“For many Internet companies, the litigation itself can
be fatal even if they are complying fully with copyright law. For these reasons, content industries
can often ‘win’ simply by filing litigation so long as the litigation is expensive.”).
166. Tehranian, supra note 17, at 267.
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opportunity costs and litigation costs can bankrupt a company.167 Thus,
copyright uncertainty risks “strike suits by content owners who have the
financial resources to withstand lengthy and expensive litigation.”168 The lesson
is that the mere threat of litigation is often sufficient for market incumbents to
wield power over new entrants.169
By giving so much power to incumbent forces, copyright is not optimized to
foster and spur innovation.170 Copyright’s digital rights management (DRM)
policies, for example, have hindered innovation.171 DRM restrictions have
dampened the opportunities to innovate and create complementary markets
around copyrighted works.172 Such policies have slowed innovation and
167. Blevins, supra note 150, at 1823 (“Major record labels ultimately sued Veoh for
secondary copyright liability, but Veoh prevailed at both the district court and in the Ninth Circuit.
In modern copyright litigation, however, winning isn’t everything. By the time the Ninth Circuit
released its opinion, Veoh had gone bankrupt, citing excessive litigation costs.”); Eliot Van
Buskirk, Veoh Files for Bankruptcy After Fending Off Infringement Charges, WIRED, Feb. 12,
2010, 3:49 PM, https://www.wired.com/2010/02/veoh-files-for-bankruptcy-after-fending-offinfringement-charges/ (noting that after prevailing in a copyright infringement suit filed by
Universal Music Group, Veoh entered bankruptcy due to “distraction of the legal battles, and the
challenges of the broader macro-economic climate”).
168. Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1224 (2011); see also Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the
Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4 (1990) (offering “a model that explains
strike suits as a result of defendant uncertainty regarding the merit of plaintiffs’ claims”). As one
scholar noted, “The plaintiffs do not necessarily need to prevail on the merits —in many cases, they
merely need to survive dispositive motions that would limit discovery or would halt the litigation
altogether.” Blevins, supra note 150, at 1830.
169. Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59,
78 n.67 (1993) (“The ability to threaten to impose high litigation costs will improve the bargaining
position of the party with superior resources.”); Blevins, supra note 150, at 1824 (“The lesson is
that copyright enforcement against Internet platforms can often succeed merely by increasing the
potential costs of enforcement proceedings.”).
170. Lee, supra note 83, at 1439 (“The paradox is that, of all the areas of law, copyright law
most directly bears on what new Internet platforms can be developed legally, yet copyright law is
the least developed to spur innovation in new platforms today.”). On the other hand, the overall
net result of copyright policy on innovation has arguably been good for Silicon Valley. Courts and
Congress have facilitated the development of e-commerce. Chander, supra note 127, at 668–69
(“[J]ust as nineteenth-century American judges altered the common law in order to subsidize
industrial development, judges and legislators at the turn of the Millennium altered the law to
subsidize the development of Internet companies.”).
171. Randal Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts, in
ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 180 (François Lévêque &
Howard Shelanski eds., 2005) (“Producers often try to make life tough for their competitors and in
many situations incumbents seize upon copyright law to create entry barriers.”); Seltzer, supra note
81, at 919 (2010) (exploring the impact of digital rights management (DRM) “on user innovation
and on the permitted development of media technology[, b]ecause DRM systems, by design and
contract, must be hardened against user-modification, they foreclose a whole class of technology
and an entire mode of development”).
172. See Lohmann, supra note 161, at 852. See also Wu, supra note 6, at 331–32; Wu, supra
note 122, at 141–46.
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development around DVDs173 and e-books.174 These policies undermine the
generative qualities of digital media.175 Users are disabled from tinkering and
innovating. Rather than just a passive recipient, users are an underappreciated
source of product innovations.176 Allowing users to adapt and contribute to
innovations helps produce better products.177 This exchange of information and
ideas fosters a democratic environment and an empowered user.178
173. Seltzer, supra note 81, at 917–18 (contrasting the development and diversity of musiccapable devices against the limits around recorded movies and concluding “DVD’s DMCA-backed
encryption locks out independent developers and much experimentation”).
174. Id. at 918.
[I]n a DRM-encumbered world, a media educator cannot cue movie clips for classroom
commentary without special exemption; a literary critic is blocked from extracting ebook pages (or has the e-book deleted out from under her); and a mashup artist is
restricted in sampling scope. These restrictions are direct consequences of DRM,
problematic for copyright and culture.
Id.
175. Id. at 958.
[A]nticircumvention’s restrictions are troublesome because they explicitly bar a
particular mode of development—the public mode of free and open source software
development—that has been increasingly successful in both commercial and noncommercial production. Anticircumvention forecloses end-user tinkering and innovation
and cements a centralized industrial structure, just at the time when technology offers us
the means and networked opportunity to do more from the distributed edges of the
Internet.
Id.
176. Julian Sanchez, Infringement and Innovation in Online Platforms, NOTES FROM THE
LOUNGE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.juliansanchez.com/2012/01/24/infringement-and-innovationin-online-platforms (“Online innovation is a collaborative process, and the most interesting uses
the users find for your platform won’t neecessarily [sic] be the ones you intended.”); Eric Von
Hippel, Users Rule, MIT TECH. REV., (Feb. 22, 2011) (noting “users of a technology, whether
they’re individuals or companies, are usually the initial developers of important innovations that
enable them to do new things and create new markets”).
177. Seltzer, supra note 81, at 967.
[U]sers—whether in their roles as amateur hobbyists, professional scientists, or
programmers—often build or adapt tools for their own use, to serve previously unmet
needs . . . . Their innovations may later be followed by and shared with other similarly
situated users. Second, end-users can contribute to commercial innovation indirectly,
serving as research labs for commercial suppliers. Even when the end-users do not
themselves produce in large scale, their innovations may be adopted by established firms.
Id.
178. See id. at 968.
[U]ser innovation produces distributional benefits. The distribution of wealth and access
may be fairer in a field open to user innovation than in one closed to it. Access may be
more democratic, open to those who are time-rich and money-poor (and offering new
fields of entrepreneurship by which people may make time into money). Particularly
users with niche needs will be better served by self-innovating. Moreover, the userinnovator is empowered to think of him or herself as more than a mere consumer, and
perhaps, like the Jeffersonian yeoman farmer, to become more involved in governance
of the information environment.
Id.
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Creative destruction theory teaches that incumbents are not optimized to
develop new markets or new delivery methods for content.179 Entrenched in the
current market, incumbents focus on current consumers and under-invest in new,
immature technologies.180 Incumbents often do not know how to fully exploit
new technology.181 The full potential of new innovations is not always
appreciated at the inception.182 Copyright holders often “undervalue the social
benefits that a new technology offers.”183 As one commentator observed, “On
the Internet, you don’t know what a new technology is for until you see what
people do with it.”184 Outsiders are key to developing disruptive technologies.185
Copyright should not be an artificial impediment to the cycle of innovation.
Incumbent forces should not be relied upon to craft appropriate copyright
policy.186 Copyright holders aim to maximize their own economic interest; they
are not a proxy for the public’s interest.187 Undoubtedly, disruptive technology
can destroy existing industries.188 But copyright is not intended to shield any
179. Lohmann, supra note 161, at 846.
Ironically, many of the very characteristics that guarantee their success as incumbents
create the disabilities that prevent them from recognizing the opportunities presented by
disruptive technologies. A variety of both internal and external forces conspire to make
established firms either reject investments in disruptive innovations or mis-invest by
treating them as sustaining innovations.
Id. See also Burk, supra note 59, at 76.
180. See Lee, supra note 83, at 1438. “Simply stated, the copyright innovator’s dilemma is the
following: the more innovative or different a speech technology is in terms of utilizing content, the
more likely the technology will face a copyright lawsuit or challenge.” Id. at 1439.
181. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 115, at 42 (observing that leading companies have been
successful in implementing “sustaining” innovations but have failed to keep pace with disruptive,
radical innovations).
182. Id. at 131(“[N]either manufacturers nor customers know how or why the products will be
used, and hence do not know what specific features of the product will and will not ultimately be
valued.”).
183. Lee, supra note 11, at 826.
184. Julian Sanchez, Infringement and Innovation in Online Platforms, NOTES FROM THE
LOUNGE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.juliansanchez.com/2012/01/24/infringement-and-innovationin-online-platforms.
185. Lohmann, supra note 161, at 849 (“An organization cannot disrupt itself. It can only
implement technologies in ways that sustain its profit or business model.”).
186. See Litman, supra note 49, at 860–61 (recounting how incumbents have proposed and
drafted various amendments to the Copyright Act).
187. Lee, supra note 11, at 827.
But precisely because it is not their [major copyright industries] business, we should be
wary of allowing them to dictate or limit the ways in which new speech technologies are
developed. The copyright industry is supposed to maximize the profits of their
shareholders, not the overall welfare of the public.
Id.
188. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond
Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539, 564 (2003) (“Under certain circumstances, new
technologies that facilitate copying and distribution of creative works strike at the foundations of
copyright and the industries built upon the economics of the printing press.”).
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particularly industry or incumbent.189 Rather, copyright exists to fix the problem
of public goods. The purpose of copyright is to incent creation and
dissemination of original works.190 In fact, the use of copyright to insulate an
industry player from creative destruction undermines healthy markets.
Copyright exists to promote progress, and creative destruction is key to
promoting progress and preventing stagnation.
III. COPYRIGHT POLICY & FREE EXPRESSION
The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”191 The First Amendment protects
several overlapping goals, including a robust marketplace of ideas in the ongoing
pursuit for truth,192 informed participation in our democracy,193 and the liberty
of self-realization and individual autonomy.194 The First Amendment and
copyright policy can work in tandem to promote free expression interests.195 As
189. See id. at 566.
File sharing, therefore, is a serious threat, one that strikes at the very foundation of a
business model based upon distributing content to the public. However, copyright does
not protect against this type of threat. Copyright protects the distribution of creative
works in general, not a particular industry or business model.
Id.
190. Id. at 572 (“The purpose of copyright is not to maximize the individual wealth of
copyright holders, or even to maximize creativity. The purpose of copyright is to remove the
obstacles to creation imposed by problems associated with public goods, and to put creation on an
even playing field with other endeavors.”).
191. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
192. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee.”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”).
193. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 98 (1960) (“To be free does not mean to be well
governed. It does not mean to be justly governed. It means to be self-governed.”); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (“Self-government
can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous
devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”); Robert
Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011) (defining
“speech” as “speech acts and media of communication that are socially regarded as necessary and
proper means of participating in the formation of public opinion”).
194. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 966 (1978) (arguing that “[s]peech is protected not as a means to a collective good but
because of the value of speech conduct to the individual”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech
ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled ‘individual self-realization.’”).
195. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”).
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the Supreme Court noted, “By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas.”196
In theory, copyright is speech-enhancing because it incentivizes an author to
create and, without such incentive, the author, in theory, would not have
created.197 Copyright policy has a noble purpose, but copyright policy that is
out of balance threatens our core values. Copyright lawsuits are being used in
lieu of legitimate debate. Use of a government-backed monopoly to censor
unpopular speech is deeply troubling in a nation that values democratic selfgovernance. As one scholar noted:
Instead of engaging in robust free speech to convince the public of the
merits of their respective views, organizations at the front lines of
leading cultural and political issues have waged a proxy war against
each other through the prism of copyright law by raising infringement
claims as a means to silence their opponents.198
The attractiveness of modern copyright as a weapon to chill speech is due to
four interrelated factors: (1) the ease and “ubiquity” of infringement; (2) the
simplicity of asserting a prima facie infringement case; (3) the uncertainty of
available defenses, like fair use; and (4) the threat of hefty statutory penalties.199
Censorship by copyright undermines core First Amendment principles.
Copyright out of balance threatens our liberty to learn.200 Copyright threatens
access to the building blocks of learning and culture. For example, a survey of
visual artists and visual arts professionals found that one-third have avoided or
abandoned work in their field because of copyright concerns.201 And more than
one-half of their editors and publishers have also abandoned projects, such as
illustrated books and articles.202 Copyright concerns have thwarted digital
dissemination of cultural and scientific works by museums and libraries,203

196. Id.
197. Alfred C. Yen, The Challenges of Following Good Advice About Copyright and the First
Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 412, 412–13 (2016).
198. Tehranian, supra note 17, at 262.
199. Id. at 266.
200. Patterson, supra note 45, at 266 (noting the “vital link between learning and liberty” and
worrying “the money-makers will take our liberty to learn” because “[t]hat is the beginning of
tyranny”).
201. Patricia Aufderheide et al., Copyright, Permissions, and Fair Use among Visual Artists
and the Academic and Museum Visual Art Communities, COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION 5 (Feb.
2014), http://www.collegeart.org/pdf/FairUseIssuesReport.pdf.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., The Art Institute of Chicago et. al, Comments on Orphan Works and Mass
Digitization (Feb. 4, 2013), http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_10222012/Museums.pdf;
Sarah E. Thomas, Response by the Cornell University Library to the Notice of Inquiry Concerning
Orphan Works, (March 23, 2005), http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf.
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retarded dissemination of works of historically marginalized communities,204
and undermined preservation of degrading older works.205 The dissemination of
new ideas has been undermined by copyright concerns.
Copyright out of balance also threatens the advancement of the arts. History
teaches that borrowing and building upon prior works has been a common
practice for centuries.206 It is reflected in the works of classical artists like
Handel and Beethoven and modern artists like Ray Charles and Public Enemy.207
A similar culture of borrowing and building upon also exists in the literary
world.208 Authorship invariably borrows from existing material.209 While
cultural cross-fertilization has brought us new art, modern copyright threatens
this practice. Legal scholars query whether, under modern copyright, “jazz, soul
or rock and roll [would] be legal if they were reinvented today?”210 They
distressingly conclude: “We are not sure.”211

204. Steven Seidenberg, Orphaned Treasures: A Trove of Historic Jazz Recordings Has Found
a Home in Harlem, But You Can’t Hear Them, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 47, 48 (noting that copyright
concerns held up unreleased jazz recordings from the 1930s and 1940s); Brianna Dahlberg, The
Orphan Works Problem: Preserving Access to the Cultural History of Disadvantaged Groups, 20
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 275, 288 (2011) (“[T]he orphan works problem disproportionately
impacts access to cultural works by minorities, women, and other disadvantaged groups.”); Letter
from Tim Brooks to Jule L. Sigall, Initial Comment in Response to Notice of Inquiry on Orphan
Works 2 (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0579Brooks.pdf (noting reissue of early sound recordings by African-Americans, which was planned to
accompany the release of the book, Lost Sounds: Blacks and the Birth of the Recording Industry,
1890–1919, “had to be aborted because of the time and cost involved in locating and dealing with
rights holders,” according to the book’s author).
205. In a letter from the American Film Heritage Association to Senator Strom Thurmond,
Chairman Larry Urbanski stated “that as much as 75% of motion pictures from the 1920s are no
longer clearly owned by anyone, and film preservationists as such cannot obtain the necessary
permissions to preserve them.” Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3740 n.3 (Jan. 26, 2005).
206. Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Property and Public Values: The Place of the User in
Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 374 (2005) (“[I]t will perhaps be helpful to remember
that copyright is a system of legal regulation overlaid on processes of human learning and creativity
that have existed for millennia.”).
207. JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, THEFT! A HISTORY OF MUSIC 52 (2017).
208. For example, Virgil borrowed a minor character from Homer’s Odyssey in writing his
epic poem Aeneid. The Aeneid is an epic poem that tells the legendary story of Aeneas, a Trojan
who travelled to Italy, where he became an ancestor of the Romans. See Stacey M. Lantagne,
Sherlock Holmes and the Case of the Lucrative Fandom: Recognizing the Economic Power of
Fanworks and Reimagining Fair Use in Copyright, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 263,
267 (2015) (“Virgil’s ‘Aeneid’ was essentially a piece of ‘Iliad’ fan fiction, focusing on a secondary
character from that story.”).
209. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983) (“The central problem is that all works are to some extent based on
works that precede them.”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990)
(“But the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than
it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.”).
210. BOYLE & JENKINS, supra note 207.
211. Id.
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Copyright policy is out of balance not only because of its breadth, but also
because of its indiscriminate, automatic application to all original works of
authorship. This indiscriminate application of copyright has created the “orphan
works” problem.212 Automatic protection coupled with elimination of
formalities has created an explosion of works for whom ownership is
unknown.213 And unclear ownership holds up productive use of these creative
works.214 The transaction costs to identify and locate rightsholders is often
prohibitive.215 In fact, orphan works have been dubbed “hostage works” by
some scholars.216 By failing to claim her work, a copyright owner creates a work

212. Former Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters has described the orphan works problem
as “pervasive.” See Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, (March 13, 2008)
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html.
Scholars cannot use the important letters, images and manuscripts they search out in
archives or private homes, other than in the limited manner permitted by fair use or the
first sale doctrine. Publishers cannot recirculate works or publish obscure materials that
have been all but lost to the world. Museums are stymied in their creation of exhibitions,
books, websites and other educational programs, particularly when the project would
include the use of multiple works. Archives cannot make rare footage available to wider
audiences. Documentary filmmakers must exclude certain manuscripts, images, sound
recordings and other important source material from their films. The Copyright Office
finds such loss difficult to justify when the primary rationale behind the prohibition is to
protect a copyright owner who is missing. If there is no copyright owner, there is no
beneficiary of the copyright term and it is an enormous waste. The outcome does not
further the objectives of the copyright system.
Id.
213. After the passage of the 1976 Act—and the removal of all formalities with the enactment
of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568 (1988)—federal copyright
protection no longer depends on compliance with formalities, like affixing a copyright notice or
registering the work. Copyright protection attaches at the moment of fixation in a tangible medium
of expression.
214. See, e.g., David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States,
37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 3 (2013) (“Over the last decade, the problem of orphan works—i.e.,
copyrighted works whose owners cannot be located by a reasonably diligent search—has come
sharply into focus as libraries, archives and other large repositories of copyrighted works have
sought to digitize and make available their collections online.”); Reid, supra note 45, at 432–34
(discussing the “orphan works” problem and the deadweight losses caused by the decision to forgo
using copyrighted works in ways that would contribute to education, culture, and research).
215. David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C.L. REV. 139, 156 (2009) (“[I]n a
culture where the stakes of infringement are enormous, potential users must spend enormous
amounts of time and money trying to track down the owners of such works and make sure they
have cleared the rights to them.”); Reid, supra note 45, at 432 (discussing that “notice failure
increases the transaction costs to license a work”).
216. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to
Hostage Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431, 1434 (2012).
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that others are wary to use. This chilling effect creates undeniable deadweight
loss.217
On the other hand, copyright policy in balance can further democratic selfgovernance.218 Copyright can increase public discourse by lowering the costs
of educating,219 informing,220 and keeping the public informed.221 By design,
our copyright system removes government licensing from the publishing
business.222 Rather than relying on royal patronage and crown monopolies like
our British forebears, U.S. copyright policy relies on the free market to stimulate
and reward the progress of science.223 Copyright can foster a democratic culture
by allowing broad participation in the diffusion of knowledge.224
Our First Amendment values require engaged participants.225 Participants
must be free to engage with their peers, their culture, and the important ideas of

217. “When a copyright owner cannot be identified or is unlocatable, potential users abandon
important, productive projects, many of which would be beneficial to our national heritage.”
Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of
Representatives,
110th
Congress,
2nd
Session,
(March
13,
2008)
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html.
218. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
339 (1996) (“Copyright serves to support a system of self-reliant authorship, expressive diversity,
and the dissemination of information that, given its vital importance for democratic governance, is
and should be subsidized, at least to some extent, at the expense of nonexpressive production.”).
219. Chander, supra note 127, at 690 (noting internet-based “firms improve the productivity
of workers and disseminate knowledge across the world. Individuals increasingly learn through
tutorials posted on YouTube.”).
220. Balkin, supra note 21, at 11.
[S]ocial media lower the costs of informing and organizing people quickly. Collective
action requires trust—especially collective action that might be punished. I will not
protest unless I know that other people will, too. Social media allow political
entrepreneurs to convey the message that many people feel upset at the government, and
this helps create the belief that if ordinary citizens act, others will, too.
Id.
221. Id.
[S]ocial media allow individuals to report quickly and easily if government overreacts to
protests or otherwise misbehaves. This provides additional sources of grievance and
additional motivation. Protests of previous government actions—often at funerals and
memorials—can become important drivers of continuing protest. Conversely, reports
that the government has been unable to stop protests have a snowball effect; they bolster
trust and courage and the belief that joining in is worth the effort and the risk.
Id.
222. See Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 316, 338 (2008).
223. See, e.g., JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE: PRINTING AND THE PREHISTORY
OF COPYRIGHT 14 (2002); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
151 (1968).
224. Netanel, supra note 218, at 289.
225. See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal
Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2505 (2003).

2019]

Copyright Policy As Catalyst and Barrier

63

the day. Participants are both recipients and re-makers of copyrighted works.226
It is a basic human instinct to observe others, compare, and imitate. Thus,
participants need access to copyrighted works and the freedom to consume,
rework, and communicate about those same works.227
Democratic participation is key to creating a democratic culture.228 As Jack
Balkin noted, “The idea of a democratic culture captures the inherent duality of
freedom of speech: Although freedom of speech is deeply individual, it is at the
same time deeply collective because it is deeply cultural.”229 A free democratic
culture needs the freedom to culture-make.230
Culture-making, in turn, is the freedom to incorporate existing materials,
memes, and resources.231 Culture-making needs the freedom to replicate and
derivate. Culture-making is appropriative232 and iterative.233 Culture-making
results from the full range of uses and remixes of creative works.234 Freedom of
expression is key to the cycle of exchange that builds common themes and
narratives, which form the basis of shared culture.235 In our social interactions

226. Cohen, supra note 206, at 348 (“[U]sers play two important roles within the copyright
system: Users receive copyrighted works, and (some) users become authors.”).
227. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C.L. REV . 397, 422 (2003)
(“Some degree of freedom and autonomy when interacting with a copyright work is necessary to
obtain full meaning from that work. The law must allow for freedom to communicate about that
work, and even freedom to manipulate the work.”).
228. Balkin, supra note 2, at 35 (“A democratic culture is the culture of a democratized society;
a democratic culture is a participatory culture.”).
229. Id. at 5.
230. Id. at 46–47.
Freedom is participation. Freedom is distribution. Freedom is interaction. Freedom is
the ability to influence and be influenced in turn. Freedom is the ability to change others
and to be changed as well. Freedom is the ability to glom on and route around. Freedom
is appropriation, transformation, promulgation, subversion, the creation of the new out
of the old. Freedom is mixing, fusing, separating, conflating, and uniting. Freedom is
the discovery of synergies, the reshuffling of associations and connections, the
combination of influences and materials. Freedom is bricolage.
Id.
231. Cohen, supra note 206, at 372 (“The ‘play of culture’ describes degrees of freedom within
this network; it is the process by which culture bends and folds unpredictably, bringing new groups,
artifacts, and practices into unexpected juxtaposition.”).
232. Balkin, supra note 2, at 4.
Freedom of speech is appropriative because it draws on existing cultural resources; it
builds on cultural materials that lay to hand. Dissenters draw on what they dislike in
order to criticize it; artists borrow from previous examples and build on artistic
conventions; even casual conversation draws on common topics and expressions.
Id.
233. Id. at 34 (free expression on the Internet “is part of an interactive cycle of social exchange,
social participation, and self-formation”).
234. Cohen, supra note 206, at 373 (“Consumption, communication, self-development, and
creative play merge and blur into one another, and the play of culture is the result.”).
235. Balkin, supra note 2, at 6.
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we draw from the existing cultural milieu to adopt, criticize, and reference
common experiences and information.
First Amendment expressive interests are central to culture-making.236
Policymakers should not let copyright holders dictate how users consume and
interact with cultural artifacts. The First Amendment and copyright lie at the
intersection of “struggles over discursive power—the right to create, and control,
cultural meanings.”237 Profit-motivated private actors cannot be ceded the
responsibility of protecting the public’s interest. The public’s interests in selfexpression, autonomy, and culture-making may not be consonant with copyright
holder’s interests in commodifying their creative works.
We must ensure a robust architecture that promotes the diffusion of
innovation, the progress of science, and a healthy marketplace of ideas.
Freedom of expression needs an infrastructure that supports it.238 And modern
speech theory must account for the new opportunities and risks that modern
digital communication technologies enable.239
We are on the precipice of new opportunities and new risks to free expression
with new technology.240 Technology has enabled a sharing economy, where
open collaboration and conversation are the new norm.241 Sharing, mixing,

Freedom of speech is valuable because it protects important aspects of our ability to
participate in the system of culture creation. Participation in culture is important because
we are made of culture; the right to participate in culture is valuable because it lets us
have a say in the forces that shape the world we live in and make us who we are.
Id.
236. Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright
Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 295 (1996) (arguing that copying and use
of creative works enable processes of social meaning-making).
237. Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 69, 70 (2000).
238. Balkin, supra note 9, at 432 (“A system of free speech depends not only on the mere
absence of state censorship, but also on an infrastructure of free expression.”); Joseph P. Liu,
Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 451 (2007) (“[P]rotecting free
speech interests requires us not to be content with the mere existence of these [free speech]
safeguards, but to think seriously about mechanisms for reducing the chilling effect of
uncertainty.”).
239. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 440; see also Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (1967); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986).
240. Balkin, supra note 2, at 3 (“The digital revolution offers unprecedented opportunities for
creating a vibrant system of free expression. But it also presents new dangers for freedom of
speech, dangers that will be realized unless we accommodate ourselves properly to the changes the
digital age brings in its wake.”).
241. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 148 (2008).
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appropriating, and creating a cultural pastiche is standard in digital media.242
Yet incumbent forces threaten to create an oligopoly over popular culture.243
Modern digital media is fundamentally different from prior disruptive
technologies.244 As the Supreme Court recently noted, “While we now may be
coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic
proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to
alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be.”245 Social
media has proven it has the power to influence cultural and political
movements.246
Digital media democratizes free expression: everyone with access can do it.247
New digital technologies magnify the free expression interests at the heart of the

242. Balkin, supra note 2, at 12.
What I have called glomming on—the creative and opportunistic use of trademarks,
cultural icons, and bits of media products to create, innovate, reedit, alter, and form
pastiches and collage—is a standard technique of speech in the digital world. Glomming
on is cultural bricolage using cultural materials that lay to hand.
Id.
243. Travis, supra note 5, at 680 (“Despite modern aspirations for a universal, publicly-funded
dissemination of culture and enlightenment, the production of popular culture in modern societies
generally remained an oligopolistic and oligarchical affair.”).
244. Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1279
(2002) (“While the law has lagged behind technological developments in the past, the Internet
seems to present challenges of an entirely different order.”); Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality:
Enhancing Freedom of Expression in Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.
487, 512 (2016); Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2039–40
(2006) (articulating a descriptive and normative theory on what makes the Internet special).
When massive platforms combine the functions of conduits, content providers, and data
brokers, analogies from old free expression cases quickly fall apart . . . . It is time to think
beyond the old categories and to develop a new way of balancing dominant platforms’
rights and responsibilities . . . . Platforms should also acknowledge their de facto role as
public forums and quasi-judicial law interpreters, even if they resist taking on all the de
jure responsibilities such roles imply for state actors.
Pasquale, supra note 245, at 512.
245. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
246. Balkin, supra note 21, at 8–11 (discussing infrastructure of free expression and the
“Twitter Revolution” in Iran); Anupam Chander, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1505,
1520–21 (2012) (highlighting the role of the Internet in the Arab revolutions). But see Andrew
Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 273 (2014).
As the Occupy Wall Street protests caught fire, attracting support, enthusiasm, outrage,
controversy, and intense media scrutiny, the #occupywallstreet hash-tag nonetheless
failed to achieve the status of a Twitter Trend. The Twitter algorithm, with its emphasis
on new news, discovery, disruption, and cross-cluster penetration was presumably
unconcerned with the expressive implications that granting or withholding
#occupywallstreet the special status of a trend entailed.
Id.
247. Balkin, supra note 2, at 9 (“[L]owering the costs of transmission, distribution,
appropriation, and alteration of information democratizes speech.”).
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First Amendment.248 The potential of a bi-directional, mass-participatory digital
medium is hard to overstate. Today more of our lives are mediated online.249
We inform and express ourselves online.250 The pervasiveness of digital media
is illustrated by the popularity of the internet meme that adds “Wi-Fi” and
“Battery Life” to psychologist Abraham Maslow’s classic hierarchy of needs.251

Figure 1. At the bottom of Maslow’s classic hierarchy of needs “Wi-Fi” and
“Battery Life” are added.

248. Balkin, supra note 9, at 436–37 (“What makes the Internet so vibrant and so special is
precisely that many different people get to communicate—not just people who own or work for
large, mass media organizations. That is also what makes the Internet so full of content and
discussions on every possible topic.”).
249. Tutt, supra note 246, at 257 (“As more of social, political, and economic life pours onto
the Internet and onto these centralized platforms, it becomes more essential to join and participate
in them. The Internet is not a complement to the ordinary incidents of democratic life so much as
a substitute for them.”). See also id. at 254 (“Life in all its particulars is increasingly integrated
with the Internet and increasingly lensed through powerful platforms.”).
250. Travis, supra note 5, at 728 (“Today, the public informs itself of the world by consulting
blogs, mashups, e-books, and other forms of expression mediated by online free speech
institutions.”).
251. A. H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 370, 375
(1943).
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The internet has been touted as the ultimate free speech institution.252 As one
scholar observed, “[T]he Internet has effectively harnessed the world’s interests,
creativity, and intelligence to produce an enormous archive of, well,
everything.” 253 This explosion of accessible information in digital media has
increased the value of curated information. The abundance of information can
turn into noise on the internet. In classic information theory, noise is defined as
an external input that distorts the quality of the signal between the sender and
the received.254 Curation is one answer to this noise problem.255 But sites that
allow users to upload, store, and share their files have faced lawsuits.256
Pinterest, for example, is a popular curation site, but its copyright legality is
unclear.257 To achieve the full, democratizing potential of an interconnected,
digital world we need a vibrant exchange of ideas and innovations.258 And to
achieve such a vibrant exchange we should minimize copyright policies that
hamper these ends.

252. Travis, supra note 5, at 679 (“As both the Supreme Court and the Federal
Communications Commission have observed, the Internet is the ultimate free speech institution,
one that enables uninhibited expression that grows exponentially.”).
253. Balkin, supra note 9, at 437.
254. See generally C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL
SYSTEM TECHNICAL J. 379, 379 (1948); CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE
MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 63 (1949).
255. Balkin, supra note 2, at 7.
Because so many people are producing content and sending it everywhere, audiences are
pummeled with vast amounts of information which they must collate, sort, filter, and
block. Hence, the digital revolution brings to the forefront the importance of organizing,
sorting, filtering, and limiting access to information, as well as the cultural power of those
who organize, sort, filter, and limit access.
Id.
256. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011) (Veoh),
opinion withdrawn and superseded, Nos. 09-55902, 09-56777, 10-55732, 2013 WL 1092793 (9th
Cir. Mar. 14, 2013); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 729–30 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
257. Compare Lee, supra note 83, at 1450 (“Pinterest is the most successful website (in terms
of users) to provide a platform for people to “curate” content from the Internet. Despite its apparent
social value to millions of people, Pinterest has a major problem: its legality under copyright law
is unclear.”), with Chander, supra note 127, at 694.
The Japanese firm Rakuten led a $100 million investment into Pinterest, a website that
allows an individual to copy any image across the web to post on one’s own scrapbook
page. Were it not for safe harbors in the law, Rakuten would likely have been loath to
invest in a company whose business model relied on its users’ engaging in rampant
copyright infringement. Even more important, without such safe harbors, people
everywhere would have been denied a simple way to express themselves and to share
what they love with the world.
Chander, supra note 127, at 694.
258. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 428–29 (2006).
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Our information policies affect our democratic, free speech values; we need
policies that encourage innovation and discourage incumbent forces from
blocking new ideas, new products, and new applications.259 Access to building
blocks of learning and culture are threatened by commodification of
information.260 We need a full-throated support of new opportunities for
creation and expression. Yet current copyright liability threatens valuable
speech261 and chills the flow of capital and energies toward new technologies.262
The threats to speech and innovation illustrate how copyright policy is out of
balance; the next part of this Article, therefore, discusses several sensible
solutions.
IV. RECALIBRATING COPYRIGHT POLICY
Capacious copyright, ease of infringement, and the risk of supracompensatory statutory damages are a recipe to chill innovation and free speech.
Copyright today risks harming the progress of science. We need a release valve
for the hydraulic pressure from expanding copyright. I thus lay out below three
sensible, and interrelated, proposals for reform. First, Congress should eliminate
statutory damages for innocent infringers and good faith fair users.263 Second,
courts should reinvigorate the bright-line Sony rule for dual-use technologies.
And third, I propose a two-stage adjustment to protect First Amendment
interests: (1) I propose robust fair use protection for uses that do not undermine
the incentive to create, and (2) for socially valuable uses that do risk
undermining the incentive to create, I propose shifting to a liability rule
approach, rather than a property rule approach. These proposals protect
important expression and innovation interests by decreasing the chill of
uncertainty.
A. Recalibrating Statutory Damages
Today copyright operates as a strict liability tort without proof of intent to
infringe and affords statutory damages without proof of actual damages. The
availability of statutory damages against innocent infringers and good faith fair
users, without evidence of actual damage, is a recipe to chill. Courts have noted
that statutory damages are intended to “provide reparation for injury” as well as

259. Balkin, supra note 9, at 442.
260. Patterson, supra note 45, at 266 (arguing that “access to learning[ is] endangered by the
efforts of copyright owners to make a commodity of all the knowledge in the land for the purpose
of obtaining private fortunes”).
261. See, e.g., Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and
Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233, 233 (2003); McKeown, supra note 109, at 2; L. Ray Patterson, The
DMCA: A Modern Version of the Licensing Act of 1662, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 34 (2002);
Tehranian, supra note 17, at 247.
262. Lee, supra note 83, at 1447.
263. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2013).
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“to discourage wrongful conduct.”264 An award of damages presumes that
compensation (or punishment) is warranted. Yet this is far from a foregone
conclusion with innocent infringers and good faith fair users.265 Without
evidence of actual damages, the need for compensation becomes hazy. And
without compensatory damages, the justification for punitive damages becomes
shaky.266
Aligning copyright’s statutory damages with copyright’s policy objectives is
critical.267 From a consequentialist perspective, hefty statutory damages coupled
with the ease of inadvertent infringement undermine the utilitarian aims of
copyright.268 To minimize the risk of liability, downstream creators will steer
clear of using others’ works, and thereby create fewer works from which the
public can draw.269 From a deontological perspective, copyright’s current policy
overwhelmingly favors copyright holders’ rights over users’ rights.270 It favors
extant works at the expense of future works. It favors current creators over
future creators.
Today, the law provides only thin protection for innocent infringers and
certain good faith fair users. I propose to expand these protections. Currently,
statutory damages are available against innocent infringer in “a sum of not less
than $200,” at the court’s “discretion.”271 For innocent infringers, the court in
264. See, e.g., id. at 71 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S.
228, 233 (1952)).
265. Cf. Reid, supra note 147, at 27 (“The ease of casual infringement means that not all acts
of infringement are equally reprehensible.”).
266. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 434 (2001); BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996).
267. Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies As A Means to Counteract Failures in Copyright
Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2011) (“Remedies, in other words, need to be taken
seriously. They should not be viewed simply as a legal by-product of the legal system’s
determination that an infringement has taken place, but rather as a complimentary means for
implementing policy.”).
268. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and Innocent Copyright
Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 767, 799 (2011) (“Imposing strict liability on innocent
downloaders may also negatively impact market competition for online distribution of works.”).
269. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
209 (1996) (“[T]he fair-use criteria are so ambulatory that no one can give a general answer.”); R.
Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS.
133, 183 (2007) (“Because copyright law seeks to encourage such noninfringing copying, the
possibility of holding innocent infringers liable should be worrisome if it deters potential users from
using copyrighted material in ways that might ultimately be found noninfringing.”); Eva E.
Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935, 963–64 (2014) (“Users (even those
with legal counsel) often find themselves unable to predict with confidence whether a use would
be deemed fair . . . . [and] risk aversion will lead some to abandon projects rather than come close
to the boundary line between fair use and infringement.”).
270. Cf. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 171–203 (1995) (discussing a lack
of intent necessary to probe strict liability, which, when applied in copyright law, would find more
infringers liable, therefore discouraging people from committing infringement).
271. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
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“its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages,” but it may not
completely eliminate statutory damages.272 Statutory damages may be reduced
from $750 to $200 per work if the court finds the “infringer was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright.”273 However, an innocent infringement defense is unavailable if a
copyright notice appears on a hard copy of the work.274 In other words, the
innocent infringer defense is rarely invoked because it is unavailable if a
copyright notice is affixed to the work.275 I propose that statutory damages
should be eliminated altogether against one whom the court determines “was not
aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright.”276 Rather than simply reducing the statutory
damage award, the court should be empowered to, in its discretion, deny
statutory damages altogether for an innocent infringer. Moreover, the presence
of a copyright notice on a work should not be an absolute barrier to mounting a
successful innocent infringer defense.
I also propose expanding protections for good faith fair users. The current
good faith fair user defense is rarely, if ever, invoked because of its unduly
narrow scope.277 Statutory damages are remitted against an infringer who
“believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the
copyrighted work was a fair use,” and the infringer was working on behalf of a
nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives, and the infringement was
of the exclusive right to reproduce the work—as opposed to the other exclusive

272. Id.
273. Id. § 504(c)(1)–(2).
274. Id. § 504(c)(2). See id. § 401 (as provided in section 401, however, when a copy or
phonorecord bears a properly affixed notice, “no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s
interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory
damages”); see also BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying
“innocent infringer” reduction of statutory damages because copyright owner had placed copyright
notices on its published versions of recordings and downloader had access to such versions).
275. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 98, at 474–75 n.175 (finding only two cases applying
the “innocent infringer” minimum) (citing D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35–
36 (2d Cir. 1990); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740, 769–70 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), aff’d in part Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1122 (2d Cir.
1989)).
276. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). The Department of Commerce also recommended increased
protections for innocent infringement. See Dep’t of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, White
Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages: Copyright Policy, Creativity, And
Innovation
In
The
Digital
Economy
97
(Jan.
28,
2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf.
We therefore recommend amending the notice provisions in the Copyright Act so that
the innocent infringement defense remains available in cases where there is a copyright
notice . . . . [And] if a defendant mistakenly believed that he was engaging in a fair use,
the notice would not undermine that defense.
Id.
277. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 98, at 474–75.
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rights in copyrighted works.278 This defense is remarkably cramped. The good
faith fair user defense applies only to certain nonprofit and educational
institutions.279 It also applies only to the reproduction right and not any of the
other exclusive rights of a copyright holder, like the right to prepare derivative
works or the right to distribute copies of the work.280 This slender defense is of
marginal utility in the digital age because it does not apply to many online uses,
which often implicate other exclusive rights.281 For good faith fair users, I
propose that statutory damages should be unavailable against any infringer who
the court finds “believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or
her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107.”282 Period.
The additional limitations on this defense should be removed.
Innocent infringers and good faith fair users may have a lot in common, but I
recommend keeping two separate shields to statutory damages. Innocent
infringers may have a basis beyond fair use for being unaware that his or her
acts constituted an infringement.283 And a broad defense to statutory damages
for good faith fair users elevates fair use into prominence. Even if a fair use
defense is ultimately unsuccessful, a good faith fair user should be shielded from
statutory damages. Protecting a good faith fair user gives breathing space and
prevents a copyright holder from occupying copyright’s gray areas. To prevent
rights accretion, good faith fair users should be insulated from statutory
damages. Fairly debatable fair users do not warrant the deterrence and punitive
treatment of statutory damages. Courts and commentators have bemoaned the
lack of ex ante guidance on what qualifies as fair use.284 Because of the
278. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and had
reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair
use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit
educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her
employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by
reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting entity
which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities of a public
broadcasting entity (as defined in section 118(f)) infringed by performing a published
nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a
performance of such a work.
Id.
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. Dep’t of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and
Statutory Damages: Copyright Policy, Creativity, And Innovation In The Digital Economy 84 (Jan.
28, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf.
282. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
283. For example, under the 1909 Act, an innocent infringer was someone misled by the lack
of a copyright notice into believing the work was unprotected and dedicated to the public domain.
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (“an innocent infringer who has been
misled by the omission of the notice”).
284. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (noting the fair use
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flexibility and unpredictability of fair use, plausible fair users should not be
penalized.
The expanded thrust of copyright’s scope should be parried by greater
protections for innocent infringers and good faith fair users. While I propose
that statutory damages should be remitted against these users, the availability of
actual damages should remain intact. Unlike most other statutory damage
regimes, copyright’s statutory damages are a remedy for a private wrong, rather
than a remedy for a public wrong.285 Actual damages are the common remedy
for a private wrong.286 Statutory damages were intended to foster new
technology by discouraging direct infringers. 287 The original purpose of
statutory damages was to provide an assured minimum recovery for a copyright
holder, even if actual damages were elusive.288 But copyright damages are not
uniquely difficult to determine.289 The initial rationale for statutory damages is
no longer applicable.290 Statutory damages no longer seek to assure a minimum
recovery, but rather they now serve as a bounty for those who register a

defense is little more than “the right to hire a lawyer”); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 596 (2008) (colorfully describing the fair use defense’s uncertainty as
“billowing white goo”).
285. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 98, at 495 (“Copyright statutory damages aim,
moreover, to rectify a private wrong by compensating copyright owners for economic harms done
from infringement and not to remedy the sorts of public wrongs at which most statutory damage
rules are aimed.”).
286. See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the Registrar of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 101 (Comm. Print 1961) (noting
that “[l]iability of a wrongdoer for the actual damages suffered by the injured person is a traditional
remedy for civil wrongs generally”).
287. Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright
Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 303 (2009).
Unfortunately, advocates of the increase in statutory damages failed to see that it might
have the opposite of its intended effect: high statutory damages can actually deter
innovation, because these damages are awarded not only against direct infringers, but
also against technology companies held liable for secondary copyright infringement for
uses made of their innovative technologies.
Id.
288. Id. at 274 (“The original purpose of statutory damages was to provide a minimum award
to copyright owners because of the difficulty of measuring actual damages.”).
289. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 98, at 497 (“Damages in copyright are no harder to
compute than ‘injury to reputation in a defamation case, pain and suffering in a personal injury
case, or emotional distress in an insurance bad faith case, yet punitive damages in those situations
all require [due process] excessiveness review.’”) (brackets in original).
290. Id. at 496.
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copyright.291 Individual authors are less likely to benefit from the statutory
damages regime than commercial copyright holders.292
At a time when copyright was cabined largely to professional spheres,
infringement deterrence made sense. But now that copyright has expanded in
scope and duration and digital media has enabled revolutionary communication
outlets that are embedded in our daily lives, hefty deterrence no longer makes
sense as a default proposition. It should be reserved for willful infringers and
commercial pirates. Today, statutory damages indeed serve as a deterrent—
deterring entrepreneurs away from innovation and downstream creators from
creative expression.293 Statutory damages for copyright liability risks deterring
socially valuable innovation, which can harm consumers, the national economy,
and copyright holders themselves by cutting off new markets and
opportunities.294 This proposed recalibration of copyright damages for innocent
infringers and good faith fair users furthers the goals of copyright by promoting
the progress of learning and protects important free speech interests.
B. Recalibrating Secondary Liability
My second proposal is to reinvigorate the bright-line protection for dual use
innovations. Dual, or mixed, use technologies are those capable of both
infringing and non-infringing uses, like photocopiers, video recording devices,
and file-sharing networks.295 Copyright holders often perceive these dual use
technologies as a threat to their economic interests.296

291. Berg, supra note 287, at 302 (“Statutory damages were no longer about ensuring adequate
compensation to copyright owners when actual damages and profits were difficult to prove but
rather about providing extra damages to certain copyright owners.”).
292. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012) (requiring registration within three months of publication to
qualify for awards of statutory damages and attorney fees). See also Samuelson & Wheatland,
supra note 98, at 454.
293. Id. at 309.
294. Id. at 272–73.
295. MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER
OF INTELLECTUAL AND ANTITRUST LAW 106 (2010) (“Many of the innovations that consumers
have enjoyed throughout the past century fall into [the dual-use] category: the telephone, camera,
jukebox, radio, television, photocopier, VCR, computer, Internet, iPod, and P2P file-sharing
software.”).
296. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010)
(“Copyright law’s confrontation with evolving technology has been a near-constant theme since
Congress enacted its first copyright law in 1790.”); Picker, supra note 139, at 42.
A new distribution entrant wants access to the full body of copyrighted works and the
new technology will frequently make possible activities that incumbents will see as
infringing. That was certainly how sheet music publishers saw piano rolls, how record
companies saw radio, and how television broadcasters saw cable TV.
Picker, supra note 139, at 42. See also Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 66. But see DiCola & Sag,
supra note 7, at 179 (“The emergence of a new technology does not necessarily create
conflicts. No significant upheaval arises in those rare instances when content owners are also
the inventors of a new copyright technology [like DVD encryption technology].”).
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In a landmark case, Universal City Studios sued Sony Corporation for
contributory copyright infringement for selling a video recording technology
that had the potential to facilitate unauthorized copying of copyrighted works.297
The Supreme Court ruled that time-shifting copyrighted television programs to
watch at a later time was a fair use.298 Sony was thus not liable for contributory
infringement because the technology had a “substantial non-infringing use.”299
The Court’s language offered a clear-bright line for new technologies: if a
product was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, then the producer would
not be liable for copyright infringement.300 The Sony rule sought to balance
copyright owners’ rights to their works with “the rights of others freely to engage
in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”301 This balance was achieved by
withholding copyright holders’ control over nascent technology.302 A dual use
technology is shielded from contributory liability if it is capable of substantial
non-infringing uses. The Sony rule has been described as a “permissive,
protechnology test.”303
Over the years, however, subsequent cases have eroded the clarity of the Sony
safe harbor.304 In Grokster, the Supreme Court held that where there is evidence
of inducement to infringe, the Sony safe harbor does not apply: “one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster

297. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
298. Id. at 456.
299. Id.
300. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1356 (2004) (“[T]he Sony decision was intended
to provide assurance that the technology developer will not be held liable for those infringements
that consumers commit using the new technology.”).
301. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
302. Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An
Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 401 (2003) (“The driving concern in Sony was
a fear that indirect liability would have given copyright holders control over what was then a new
and still-developing technology. This the Court was unwilling to do.”).
303. Oliar, supra note 43, at 1019.
304. Lemley & Reese, supra note 300, at 1356 (“In the context of p2p networks, however,
lower court decisions have cut back the protection that the Sony doctrine offers developers of dualuse technologies, though the courts’ opinions leave some uncertainty about how far the cutback
goes.”). For example, in the Napster case, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Sony rule narrowly. A
defendant could be secondarily liable if a copyright owner could establish that the defendant knew
of the users’ infringements, and materially contributed to them. Napster, according to the court,
had “actual knowledge that specific infringing material [was] available using its system,” and could
have blocked infringers’ access, but failed to do so. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th
Cir. 2002), and aff’d sub nom. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002)
(emphasis in original). In other words, the court held that the Sony rule is merely a presumption
against imputing knowledge simply based on the manufacture of a dual use device; it is not a
complete defense.
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infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”305
But it is unclear what happens if a non-inducing company’s technology is used
primarily to infringe; the Justices split evenly on the answer. Justice Breyer
authored a three-Justice concurrence suggesting such a company would not face
secondary liability.306
But Justice Ginsburg authored a three-Justice
concurrence suggesting a company would.307
In a post-Grokster world, innovators must not only show that their technology
is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, but also that none of the touted uses
are infringing.308 But if an innovator touts a use, believing it to be a fair use, and
turns out to be wrong, then she could be liable for secondary infringement.309
Scholars bemoan the uncertainty of the erstwhile certain rule.310
I urge that courts and policymakers should err on the side of embracing, rather
than curtailing, technology that is capable of substantial non-infringing use. The
examination of whether an innovation is capable of substantial non-infringing
uses should consider not just the current uses, but also the potential future

305. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
306. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring).
[A] strong demonstrated need for modifying Sony (or for interpreting Sony’s standard
more strictly) has not yet been shown. That fact, along with the added risks that
modification (or strict interpretation) would impose upon technological innovation, leads
me to the conclusion that we should maintain Sony, reading its standard as I have read it.
Id. at 965–66 (Breyer, J., concurring).
307. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942–49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
[T]here was evidence that Grokster’s and StreamCast’s products were, and had been for
some time, overwhelmingly used to infringe, and that this infringement was the
overwhelming source of revenue from the products. Fairly appraised, the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a reasonable prospect that substantial
or commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to develop over time.
Id. at 948 (internal citations omitted).
308. Lohmann, supra note 161, at 863 (“[I]nnovators must not only prove the existence of a
substantial non-infringing use for their technology, but now must also prove that none of the uses
that they actively encourage, through advertising for example, are infringing.”).
309. Id.
In many private copying contexts, however, disruptive innovators will proudly and
actively advertise uses that they believe to be fair. Should subsequent litigation prove
these beliefs to have been mistaken, innovators could face ruinous liability as inducers.
The prospect of massive statutory damages for miscalculation of the outcome of a fair
use determination could chill a wide range of innovations that enable private copying.
Id.
310. Blevins, supra note 150, at 1850.
The original decision contemplated a bright-line rule that defeated all secondary liability
claims. In some circuits, however, Sony arguably applies only to contributory liability,
and not to vicarious and inducement liability claims. For these reasons, the Sony defense
provides little remedy against extended discovery. Thus, even if Sony helps platforms
ultimately win, its uncertainty ensures that the win will come at a high cost.
Id.; Oliar, supra note 43, at 961 (“Doctrinally, the contours of Sony’s safe harbor remain vague.”).
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uses.311 The possibility of future non-infringing uses should not be ignored.312
Dual use technologies should be given the breathing space the Sony rule
intended. Otherwise courts risk improperly depriving products and services
from the marketplace.313 New markets often take time to develop; quashing
innovation prematurely prevents complementary uses from developing.314
Dual use technology should fall outside the scope of a copyright holder’s right
to exclude unless and until there is ample evidence of harm to the copyright
holder.315 If a court gets it wrong and allows a new technology that truly
endangers a rightsholder, Congress can overrule the court and amend the law.
In other words, if the courts improperly err on the side of new technologies,
Congress is well-equipped to fix that.316 Congress has the institutional
competence to balance the stakeholders’ competing interests.317 But, on the
other hand, if a court erroneously cuts off a new technology, Congress is not
positioned to remedy that.
The lack of doctrinal certainty for dual use technology favors incumbent
copyright holders.318 This uncertainty functionally expands the scope of
copyright. An easy prima facie case of infringement coupled with hefty
statutory damages nudge the gray areas of copyright toward the rightsholder.
The costs of being wrong about the gray areas are ruinous. Rational actors steer

311. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 953–54 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“Importantly, Sony also used the word ‘capable,’ asking whether the product is
‘capable of’ substantial noninfringing uses . . . . And its language also indicates the appropriateness
of looking to potential future uses of the product to determine its ‘capability.’”) (emphasis in
original).
312. See id. at 955 (“There may be other now-unforeseen noninfringing uses that develop for
peer-to-peer software, just as the home-video rental industry (unmentioned in Sony) developed for
the VCR.”).
313. See, e.g., Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 4, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005
WL 497759 (“Because markets take time to develop, and because the future uses to which a product
may one day be put (both legitimate and illegitimate) are not necessarily evident in its early phases,
Sony allows an innovation to incubate without fear that third-party infringement (present or future)
will invite litigation.”).
314. Lohmann, supra note 161, at 854–55. See also id. at 840 (describing the “the happy lesson
of the complementary relationship that can arise between private copying technology and
copyrighted works”).
315. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975,
1023 (2002).
316. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430–31 (1984)
(“Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.”).
317. Lohmann, supra note 161, at 856 (“Congress, while perhaps not an ideal democratic
decision-maker in all copyright contexts, is better positioned to undertake the relevant sort of factfinding and has far more discretion in fashioning a nuanced approach.”).
318. Blevins, supra note 150, at 1824–25.
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clear of the gray areas, which functionally expands the zone of copyright.319 A
bright-line rule for dual use technologies would mitigate the chilling effect of
uncertainty.320
Deference toward dual use technology is an appropriate recalibration because
the copyright holder is not being denied an expected return. Disruptive
innovations, almost by definition, are not anticipated by the marketplace. It is
unlikely an author anticipated capitalizing on disruptive technology; therefore,
it is not a foreseeable incentive, but rather simply a windfall.321 There has been
enough uncertainty about the applicability of copyright to new technology, from
piano rolls to cable retransmissions, that exploiting new technology cannot
plausibly be a meaningful incentive for an author. And to the extent disruptive
technology upends the balance of power and replaces an incumbent technology,
it is merely the result of the creative destruction cycle. Copyright was never
intended to hamper the engine of progress.
Exploiting dual use technology is certainly a reward to a copyright holder, but
it should not be considered a meaningful incentive. If new uses for a copyrighted
work are not part of the incentive to create, then failure to benefit from these
new uses does not undermine the goal of copyright. Copyright is about
calibrating incentives for initial creators, secondary users, and downstream
creators. Interference with secondary users and downstream creators is
inappropriate if the initial creator’s incentives are unaffected.
Rightsholders’ expectations are not an appropriate benchmark for establishing
proper incentives. Expanded copyrights have expanded the rightsholders’
expectations. There is a feedback loop on incentives: the more control a
rightsholder has over her work, the more she expects to control and demand
rents.322 To have a meaningful assessment of appropriate incentives we need a
319. Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 7, MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 257.
Faced with impossible predictions about how as yet undeveloped technologies might be
used, ambiguous [legal] tests that would be unpredictable in their application, and nearly
limitless statutory damages for guessing wrong about the unknowable, innovators, such
as Intel, would grow timid. It would be irrational to bring new products to market in the
face of massive uncertainty; innovators, such as Intel, would have no choice but to
withhold from the market socially and economically useful products.
Id.
320. Blevins, supra note 150, at 1825 (“Given the spillovers associated with Internet platforms,
adopting bright-line rules that narrow and clarify secondary liability is a justifiable subsidy that
outweighs the associated costs of infringement.”).
321. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569, 1590 (2009) (“[C]opyright windfalls allow creators to engage in monopolistic pricing
in new markets that are unlikely to have formed a crucial part of their incentives in creating the
work.”).
322. Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 435
(2007).
Over time, the increase of rights under copyright law creates expectations among
creators, including expectations of increasingly broad rights in the future. Creators form
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baseline.323 But it cannot be predicated on the subjective expectations of
rightsholders.324 A copyright holder’s needs are limited, but her wants are
unlimited.325 Allowing rightsholders to articulate appropriate incentives leads
to the one-way ratchet of ever expanding copyrights.326
The copyright bargain’s quid pro quo can help inform the normative vision of
what a copyright holder should expect.327 Policymakers should balance control
over works with the collateral costs to innovation and free speech, rather than
simply allowing rightsholders to demand incentives. Only foreseeable
exploitation of a copyrighted work should be within a copyright holder’s zone
of control.328 Unincentivized rewards should redound to the benefit of the
public, not the copyright holder.
Exploiting dual use technology should be left to the free market. Free market
forces should be allowed to determine the highest and best use of new
innovations. The capitalist forces of creative destruction should be allowed to
uncover socially optimal uses. The entertainment industry, for example, has a
well-documented history of leveraging copyright to try to squelch new

incentives based on those expectations. When rights under copyright law fail to satisfy
expectations, creators ask lawmakers to provide them with broader rights in the name of
‘incentive.’ When lawmakers comply, the result creates higher expectations among
creators, and so on.
Id.
323. Id. at 438–39 (“[L]awmakers must decide which behaviors to encourage and which ones
to discourage. Making this decision requires lawmakers to ask not what rights people actually
expect from copyright law, but what rights they should be entitled to expect.”). See also Balganesh,
supra note 321, at 1571 (proposing “a test of ‘foreseeable copying’ to limit copyright’s grant of
exclusivity to situations where a copier’s use was reasonably foreseeable at the time of creation—
the point when the incentive is meant to operate”).
324. Stadler, supra note 322, at 435 (“In defining the rights of creators by asking about their
incentives to create, copyright law is creating and satisfying increasing expectations in a cycle that
leads inexorably to the creation of more rights.”).
325. See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright
Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 19 (2005) (“Individuals with a modicum of self-interest will claim
all that the law allows them to achieve through unilateral action.”).
326. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 46, at 344 (“Recently, copyright legislation has seemed to
be a one-way ratchet, increasing the subject matter, scope, and duration of copyright with every
amendment.”); Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007) (critiquing copyright’s expansion
and arguing that content industries have successfully lobbied Congress for copyright protection not
necessarily in the public’s interest).
327. Stadler, supra note 322, at 474.
328. Balganesh, supra note 321, at 1574–75.
In determining liability for infringement, applying a test of foreseeability would require
a court to ask whether the use complained of is one that the copyright owner (that is, the
plaintiff) could have reasonably foreseen at the time that the work was created (that is,
the point when the entitlement commences).
Id.
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technologies, from phonographs to MP3 players.329 Allowing incumbents to
foreclose competition in the U.S. risks shifting the epicenter of technology and
entertainment industries to foreign countries.330 Copyright’s purpose is to
promote progress. Without the breathing space for free expression and
innovation, entrenched copyright holders have been given the keys to keep out
competition—to the detriment of the public interest.
C. Recalibrating Fair Use
As copyright’s scope has widened and deepened, fair use should
concomitantly widen and deepen to preserve the public interest. Fair use should
be sensitive to technology and uses that foster self-governance, self-expression,
and culture-making. To protect core First Amendment interests, I propose more
robust fair use protection for uses that do not undermine the incentives to create.
And for socially valuable uses that do risk undermining the incentives to create,
I propose shifting to a liability rule approach, rather than a property rule
approach.331
Copyright has expanded in length and breadth, and I urge that fair use must
step up and parry in order to maintain the copyright balance. To do that, fair use
must return to copyright’s core principles. The cognizable harm under the fourth
factor of the fair use analysis—“undoubtedly the single most important element
of fair use”332—should be harm to the incentive to create. I argue that if a use
does not undermine reasonable and foreseeable creative incentives, then the
fourth factor should not tilt in favor of the copyright holder. As such, the law
should protect against copyright harms.333 Copyright harms should focus on
harms to incentivizing creation, not harms to maximizing profits.334 Much like
329. See, e.g., Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 3, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005
WL 497759.
For more than a century, when it first claimed that the player piano spelled the death of
American music, the [entertainment] industry has attacked in turn each new development
that facilitates copying and distribution, from phonographs to mimeographs, from
audiotape players to VCRs, from compact disks to mp3 players. As each new technology
has developed, the industry has sought to destroy or control it.
Id.
330. And free expression, much like innovation, may go abroad to find more protection. Travis,
supra note 5, at 723 (“Free trade, in this way, may protect free speech institutions from censorship,
even if the First Amendment and antitrust principles fail.”).
331. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
332. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (quoting Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
333. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 106, at 405 (“If not all harm caused by unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works is copyright harm, then copyright must have a distinguishing function.”)
(emphasis in original).
334. Id. at 404–05 (“Copyright’s goal is not simply to maximize utility. That would be a tall
order for any law. Instead, copyright tries to maximize something else, but what exactly that is—
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how antitrust cases turn on whether a challenged practice is likely to decrease
competition,335 copyright cases should inquire whether the challenged use is
likely to decrease incentives to create.336
The fair use analysis should not default in favor of licensing. Just because a
user could have licensed a use, it should not resolve whether a user must have
licensed the use. Rather than ask if the use could have been licensed,337 the
inquiry should be whether the use would kill an incentive to create. As the
Eleventh Circuit has concluded, “the ability to license does not demand a finding
against fair use.”338
Fair use should shield users who do not create copyright harms. Modern fair
use analysis focuses heavily on the first factor of the fair use and inquires if the
defendant’s use is transformative. Narrowing the fair use analysis to
transformative uses overlooks other important uses.339 Transformative uses, as
well as verbatim copying, are necessary for cultural progress.340 Verbatim
copying can be an exercise of free speech,341 and it is an important means of
informing citizens.342 A fair use inquiry that demands transformative creations
sets the bar too high and risks omitting other socially valuable uses of
copyrighted works.343
Fair use should more broadly protect speech interests.344 Culture-making
needs the freedom to interact, rework, and communicate about copyrighted

authorship, expression, or economically incentivized expression—remains less than perfectly
defined.”).
335. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm,
51 B.C.L. REV. 905, 983 (2010) (“a private antitrust plaintiff to show not just any injury, but
antitrust injury—that is, injury that results from decreased competition”).
336. Accord Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 13, 21
(2010) (“Just as courts in antitrust cases ask directly whether a challenged practice harms
competition, courts in copyright cases should ask directly whether a challenged use of a copyrighted
work harms the copyright holder’s incentives.”).
337. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1994).
338. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014).
339. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 586 (“The effect of bringing the First Amendment to copyright
through the mechanism of transformative fair use is that the property rights of the copyright owner
are limited only to make way for a second individual rightsholder, the second-coming creator.”).
340. Cohen, supra note 206, at 373 (“Scholars and judges confidently speak of inducing
creativity and discouraging slavish imitation, as if the two could be neatly separated. But if these
practices are understood not only as related but as together comprising the very stuff of ‘progress,’
it becomes harder to envision the former without the latter.”).
341. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 537.
342. Id. at 565 (“Copying promotes democracy by literally putting information in citizens’
hands.”).
343. Id. at 559 (“If rewriting, redrawing, or reshooting is the ticket to fair use, most people
won’t be able to afford to ride.”).
344. Id. at 587 (“A better approach would be to understand fair use as part of an overall system
designed to generate speech, which requires varied tactics.”).
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works.345 Individuals have an expressive interest in the works they consume.346
There is a growing trend to recognize some form of users’ rights.347 Within the
literature there has been an erosion of the narrow, author-centric view of
copyright.348 A more robust appreciation of a user’s role in copyright would, in
turn, offer more robust fair use protection to expressive uses of copyrighted
works.349 Recalibrating fair use to focus on copyright harms would give more
breathing space to noncommercial and personal uses of copyrighted works.350
Nevertheless, some expressive uses of copyrighted works may threaten the
incentive to create.351
Rather than an all-or-nothing approach to fair use, I propose that a liability
rule could add gradation between fair uses and unfair uses when First
Amendment interests are implicated. If an expressive use threatens the incentive
to create, then it is more appropriate to license rather than exclude the use.352 In
a liability rule system a newcomer has to pay a reasonable license fee, whereas
in a property rule system an incumbent can lockout competition.353
345. Liu, supra note 227, at 422 (“Some degree of freedom and autonomy when interacting
with a copyright work is necessary to obtain full meaning from that work. The law must allow for
freedom to communicate about that work, and even freedom to manipulate the work.”).
346. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 206, at 370–71; Jessica Litman, Cultural Environmentalism
@ 10: Creative Reading, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 178–79 (2007); Jennifer E. Rothman,
Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 497–98, 500, 501
(2010).
347. See, e.g., ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 8 (2015)
(characterizing authorship as an act of communication and positing a users’ rights theory of
copyright); L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW
OF USERS’ RIGHTS 15, 193, 194 (1991); Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2008) (arguing “users can and do, in fact, heavily influence what
may become a relatively accepted informal copyright practice”); Rothman, supra note 346, at 463
(“using the lens of substantive due process and liberty to evaluate users’ rights”).
348. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2921 (2006); Cohen, supra note 206, at 369; Liu, supra note 227, at 398.
349. See Cohen, supra note 206, at 364 (“A fair use doctrine more attentive to the ways in
which context shapes creative practice would be more inclined to approve them.”).
350. Id. at 352 (“The private copying cases have become the copyright system’s dirty little
secret, a site at which questions of due process are overlooked and the more difficult questions of
liability and privacy evaded.”).
351. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 537 (“[C]opying may sometimes be an instance of free speech
even when it is also copyright infringement.”).
352. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2568 (2009).
Even if a free speech/expression use is ultimately deemed infringing, perhaps the
defendants should only have to pay actual damages (e.g., a reasonable license fee), rather
than being subject to a large award of statutory damages. This option would be more
consistent with First Amendment-tailored rules in other bodies of law that regulate
speech.
Id.
353. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786–87 (2007) (discussing the different costs and methods of
enforcement associated with each rule).
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Compensation, rather than a right to exclude, could balance the competing
interests in copyright policy and foster the public interest.354
I caution that we not convert to a “fared use” model or a pay-per-use model
for all unauthorized uses.355 We should not eliminate all free fair use. If we
resort to a pay-to-play model, copyright expands.356 There is a risk that all uses
would demand compensation.357 But those who cannot afford to license still
deserve the right to expression.358 Only for those uses that undermine incentives
to create does the copyright holder deserve compensation.
A copyright holder should be limited to a reasonable license, rather than the
right to exclude, when others want to make socially valuable uses of a work. I
acknowledge the conventional wisdom that, all things being equal, a property
rule approach is preferable.359 However, in copyright, all things are not equal.
Authors’ speech is favored over users’ speech.360 Dominant, incumbent
technology is favored over new, disruptive technology.361 Rather than a
Coasean World without transaction costs, we live in a world with messy
transaction costs and institutional designs that favor some actors over others. As
outlined above, socially and economically valuable activities are being

354. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 587 (“A less restrictive alternative to current copyright law, for
example, would be a form of compulsory licensing that allows anyone to copy anything as long as
the copyright owner receives some payment, perhaps managed by a collective licensing group like
ASCAP.”).
355. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C.L. REV. 557, 564–67 (1998).
356. Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs
Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 193 (2003) (“The
liability-rule approach is so attractive . . . [but] we must be wary of a likely corollary: if injunctions
disappear in favor of monetary rewards, the scope of copyright is likely to expand.”).
357. Tushnet, supra note 46, at 590.
Everybody pays for everything, including playing a CD privately and quoting from a
book, which were never before part of the copyright owner’s rights. Indeed, such
proposals raise the possibility of potentially infinite demands for compensation. Why
stop at quotation? Why not add in payment for discussion, or for inspiration?
Id.
358. Id. at 589 (“Yet poor people also have interests in self-expression and persuasion. One
might think that freedom of speech is a way to preserve political and social equality in the face of
wealth disparities, but if wealth controlled access to foundational elements of speech, that
protection would no longer exist.”).
359. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960);
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE
L.J. 2091, 2095–96 (1997).
360. Michael D. Murray, Reconstructing the Contours of the Copyright Originality and IdeaExpression Doctrines Regarding the Right to Deny Access to Works, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 921,
939 (2014) (“The United States . . . seek[s] protections for authors, creators, and rights-holders
seemingly without regard or acknowledgment of the right of the public to access works”).
361. Greg Lastowka, Innovative Copyright, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1011, 1022 (2011) (“[C]ourts
and legislators often weigh copyright’s bird in hand more heavily than new technology’s hundred
in the bush.”).
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prevented by current copyright policy, and when socially beneficial activities
are undermined by property rules, then liability rules are preferred.
In light of the social, economic, and technological changes in the digital age,
a transition from a property rule approach to a liability rule approach is timely
and appropriate to consider.362 A strict property rule regime allows copyright
owners to lock-out competition, censor speech, and undermine socially valuable
activities. Other areas of copyright law have adopted a liability approach for
compulsory licenses, like mechanical licenses to reproduce and distribute
copyrighted musical compositions,363 cable licenses to retransmit television
broadcasts,364 and webcaster licenses to publicly transmit sound recordings over
the internet.365 If we are interested in incentives and proper allocation of costs,
liability rules would resolve some of the tensions between copyright and the First
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Copyright is intended to incentivize authors to create; it is a means to a
socially beneficial end. Copyright is not intended to yield maximum profits to
a copyright holder. Copyright policy functions as both a catalyst and barrier to
innovation and our free speech culture. Start-up companies and venture
capitalists have given compelling accounts illustrating how new innovations

362. Oliar, supra note 43, at 954 (“The law has alternated over time between protecting
copyright owners and innovators by either property rules or liability rules. The copyrightinnovation conflict is one of the most important and recurring themes in copyright law’s
evolution”).
363. 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(2) (2012). See also Patterson, supra note 45, at 259 (“To prevent
monopolization of the recording industry, Congress created the compulsory recording license for
musical compositions.”).
364. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).
365. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012).
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have been stymied by current copyright.366 Imagination and innovation go handin-hand to foster new ideas and new ways of thinking.367
A copyright policy that routinely chills new technology is suboptimal because
society loses the positive externalities that come from these unfulfilled
technologies.368 The chilling effect is welfare-reducing because it discourages
not only illegal uses, but legal uses as well.369 The Innovator’s Dilemma teaches
that newcomers are uniquely positioned to create disruptive technology because
dominant firms often try to “prevent the next big idea from succeeding.”370
But the creative destruction cycle is hampered by our copyright policies,
which enable technology entrenchment and lock out competition. The bias
ensures incumbent distributors will maintain dominance.371 Dominant firms
should not be allowed to abuse their power to the detriment of society.372 The

366. Carrier, supra note 157, at 959.
By interviewing 31 CEOs, company founders, and VPs who operated in the digital music
scene at the time of Napster and afterwards, it paints the fullest picture to date of the
effect of copyright law on innovation. The Article concludes that the Napster decision
stifled innovation, discouraged negotiation, pushed p2p underground, and led to a
venture capital “wasteland.” It also recounts the industry’s mistakes and adherence to
the Innovator’s Dilemma in preserving an existing business model and ignoring or
quashing disruptive threats to the model. And it shows how the labels used litigation as
a business model, buttressed by vague copyright laws, statutory damages, and personal
liability.
Id. Lee, supra note 83, at 1441.
A recent study, citing conversations with hundreds of startups, explained that “[a]s the
curation and distribution of creative content becomes an increasingly ripe source of
innovation, old-fashioned notions of what it means to make a copy—and how
infringement of copyright is enforced—lead to many potentially great business models
being blocked.
Id.
367. Steven H. Hobbs, Entrepreneurship and Law: Accessing the Power of the Creative
Impulse, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 11 (2009) (“Imagination and innovation work together
to generate new ideas and ways of thinking.”).
368. Berg, supra note 287, at 310 (“[A]warding statutory damages against the intermediary,
which effectively shuts down the intermediary’s company or technology, is not the socially optimal
solution because it also eliminates the positive externalities of those technologies.”).
369. See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 302, at 405.
370. Waller & Sag, supra note 115, at 2227.
371. Ku, supra note 81, at 1243 (suggesting that technology neutrality may have been about
technology entrenchment, basically ensuring that the incumbent distributors could remain powerful
even when new, more efficient vehicles arose for disseminating content); Seltzer, supra note 81, at
960.
If the incumbent can [block new, disruptive technology] using intellectual property, it
can preserve its own position for a bit longer at the expense of a public denied the
opportunities of technological improvement. It takes less foresight to seek stability by
blocking others from innovating than to innovate for oneself.
Seltzer, supra note 81, at 960.
372. See Waller & Sag, supra note 115, at 2227.

2019]

Copyright Policy As Catalyst and Barrier

85

marketplace should play a bigger role in deciding if some new information
technology is socially beneficial.373
Innovators need the freedom to experiment and bring new, disruptive
technology to the marketplace. But the threat of copyright liability has “crushing
implications” for the creators and venture capitalists who support such
innovations.374 The only ones positioned to defend in court are industry leaders
with sufficient capital to afford the litigation costs.375 It is well documented that
litigation costs can bankrupt emerging technology companies.376
If
miscalibrated, copyright risks thwarting not just new innovations, but also the
diffusion of innovative practices.377
The threat of copyright liability also has powerful implications for our free
speech culture. Freedom of expression needs more than a lack of government
censorship; it needs institutions and architecture that support free expression.378
The freedom to engage in culture-making is key to fostering a democratic, freespeech culture. Democratic culture-making needs breathing space to flourish.
Fair use should promote breathing space for the public and allow free uses of
works that do not undermine an author’s incentive to create. To the extent that
future technology and future uses allow new exploitation of copyrighted works,
that should redound to the benefit of the public and not to the copyright holder.
The copyright holder could not have anticipated unforeseen disruptive
technological changes; therefore, such uses are not part of the incentive-to-create
calculus. Much like market forces risk upending dominant forces through
disruptive technology, disruptive uses of copyrighted works also risk upending
copyright holders’ possible avenues for remuneration and profit centers.
Disruptive technology and disruptive uses of copyrighted works should not be
373. Cf. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 402 (1960)
(“That is one of the beauties of the patent system. The reward is measured automatically by the
popularity of the contribution.”).
374. Brief of the Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
16–17, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 497759
(“The mandatory mechanism of statutory damages-designed to discourage direct infringement-has
crushing implications for vendors of multi-purpose technologies, where damages from unforeseen
users can quickly mount in the millions and even billions of dollars.”) (emphasis in original).
375. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1510 (“The current copyright regime, with its broad defaults,
appears to have two predominant effects on the development of copyright-using technologies: it
either encourages risk-taking by those who can afford the liability, or discourages technological
development by those who cannot.”).
376. Berg, supra note 287, at 268 n.13 (noting “the risk of facing extremely high litigation
costs can alone put certain emerging technology companies out of business” and citing examples).
377. Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2261 (2010).
[T]he story of digital music technology is, in fact, not a tale of stifling innovation, but of
inhibited diffusion. Copyright enforcement played a role in inhibiting the adoption of
digital music technology. It frustrated the consumer’s digital music experience and
created uncertainty that hindered patently legal uses of digital music technology.
Id.
378. Balkin, supra note 21, at 7.
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unduly hampered. Creative destruction cycles are key to economic prosperity
and progress. Incumbent forces should not be allowed to hamper the cycle and
demand crippling rents.
Copyright, initially seen as the engine of creativity, now risks controlling free
expression and thwarting the next big innovation.379 The policy choices we
make with digital technology can promote innovation and free expression or can
stymie it.380 Thoughtful conversations about policy reforms require that we
appreciate the powerful collateral effects that copyright policy has on culture,
democratic self-governance, and innovation.381 We cannot ignore the free
speech and economic interests at stake in modern copyright policy. Copyright
holders should not be given veto power over freedom of expression and
innovation.
Copyright policy imposes costs and such costs are not inherently justified;
rather, they are justified so long as the benefits of the system outweigh the
costs.382 Copyright should do more good than harm.383 At this stage, I posit the
harms to the public’s interest are not justified and it is time to recalibrate
copyright. We needn’t be bound by path dependence.384 Copyright law must
be stable, yet it cannot stand still and ignore costs to innovation and free
expression.385

379. Balkin, supra note 2, at 27 (“Intellectual property, which was originally viewed as a
limited government monopoly designed to encourage innovation, has been transformed into a
bulwark against innovation, facilitating control over digital content and limiting the speech of
others.”).
380. Accord LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 30 (1999)
(discussing how computer code in a digital environment can regulate behavior); ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF F REEDOM 251 (1983) (suggesting technology “shapes the structure of
the battle, but not every outcome”).
381. Carrier, supra note 157, at 959 (“Any discussion of the appropriate role of copyright law
must consider the effects on innovation.”).
382. Wu, supra note 122, at 142.
383. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV . 1328, 1343–44
(2015).
384. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001); Stefanie A. Lindquist &
Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of
Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1172 (2005) (“The rule of law depends on stability and thus
willingly suffers the perpetuation of some incorrect rulings in exchange for the benefit of stability
and predictability of outcomes.”).
385. See ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1967) (“Law must be
stable and yet it cannot stand still.”).

